

THE CAMBRIDGE ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
THE MODERN WORLD

The Cambridge Economic History of the Modern World offers an unprecedented global account of the emergence of modern economic growth and its spread across the world since 1700. Each volume provides a series of regional studies from across the globe, as well as thematic analyses of key factors governing differential outcomes in different parts of the global economy. Written by leading experts in economic history and covering topics such as demography and human development, capital and technology, living standards and inequality, geography and institutions, trade and migration, international finance, and warfare and empire, these volumes offer the most authoritative account to date of modern economic growth.

VOLUME I

1700 to 1870

EDITED BY STEPHEN BROADBERRY AND KYOJI FUKAO

VOLUME II

1870 to the Present

EDITED BY STEPHEN BROADBERRY AND KYOJI FUKAO

THE CAMBRIDGE
ECONOMIC HISTORY OF
THE MODERN WORLD

VOLUME I
1700 to 1870

Edited by

STEPHEN BROADBERRY

University of Oxford

KYOJI FUKAO

Hitotsubashi University, Tokyo



CAMBRIDGE
UNIVERSITY PRESS

Africa: Slavery and the World Economy, 1700–1870

PATRICK MANNING

In economic history for the period from 1700 to 1870, the most prominent African issue is the institution of slavery and the long-distance slave trade – especially from Africa to the Americas but also across the Indian Ocean, across the Sahara to North Africa, and the capture and exploitation of slaves within Africa. This chapter, titled to reflect that primacy, addresses volume and direction of slave trade, theories of enslavement, and the value of sub-Saharan Africa's total exports and slave exports, 1700–1870. Following a review of the social implications of slavery in Africa and overseas, the chapter turns to interpretation of African economic life in local, regional, and global contexts, concluding with contending frameworks for assessing African economic growth.

Africa is distinctive as a world region in its populations, economies, and cultures. Yet Africa had been connected throughout time – physically and by migration of people – to other parts of the eastern hemisphere. Unquestionably, the interconnections of Africa with other areas of the world grew dramatically in the period from 1700 to 1870, though our interpretations will differ according to whether we think of these as the expansion of existing links or the forging of new ties. The size of the African continent is immense and the magnitude of African population has been a substantial portion of the human total. The physical area of Africa is more than 55 per cent that of all Eurasia.¹ Africa's population in 1700 was roughly 140 million – thus roughly equal to the populations of Europe, China, or India, and far greater than the population of the Americas, so that Africa was populated at moderate density on a world scale (Manning 2014a). Meanwhile, the fluctuations in African climate have largely paralleled those of the rest of

1 The sparsely populated Sahara is big, but so is Siberia; the difference is that the Sahara separates the dense populations on either side of it, while Siberia has a populous region only on one side.

the world. For Africa, as for other regions, the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries were a time of gradual rise in temperature and humidity after the low point of the Little Ice Age in the mid-seventeenth century.² The monsoons from the Atlantic expanded the grasslands of West Africa; the monsoons from the Indian Ocean expanded the grasslands of the northern and southern halves of Eastern Africa.

Because of the physical extent of Africa, the analysis will pay attention to variations among the continent's main regions – West, Central, Southern, Eastern, and North – as well as offering summary statements for the continent as a whole. Figure 10.1 shows the five great regions and the major river systems within each region.³

Each of these regions has a particular set of regional ecologies, major food crops, and centres of population.⁴ West Africa consists mostly of savannah, with a northern band of desert and forest at the south. Yams were the principal forest crop; sorghum and millet were the principal savannah crops; rice was grown along the western coast and Upper Niger Valley. Maize had been adopted in recent centuries. Domestic animals in the savannah included cattle, with donkeys as the main beast of burden and horses for warfare; sheep, goats, pigs, chickens were everywhere. Both coast and savannah are densely populated; over half the region's population was in modern Nigeria. In Central Africa, the equatorial forest straddles the equator, with savannah to the north and south of the forest. Yams were the principal forest crop, along with bananas; millet was pre-eminent in the savannah; manioc, recently adopted, gained importance in forest and savannah. Central African population, while relatively sparse, was densest in the southern savannah. Eastern Africa, the most ecologically diverse region, includes regions of desert in north and east, temperate climate in Ethiopian and Great Lakes highlands, savannah in the middle Nile and south-eastern regions, forest in the Zambezi Valley, and the great island of Madagascar. Millet and recently adopted maize were grown in the savannah, bananas in the Great Lakes highlands, and wheat in Ethiopian highlands. Cattle were prominent in the region; camels in the deserts. Eastern Africa's population was densest in the highlands of Ethiopia and those surrounding the Great Lakes. Southern Africa

2 The Medieval Warm Period, from roughly 900 to 1300 CE, encouraged population growth throughout Africa and other regions; temperature and humidity declined regularly but unevenly until roughly 1650.

3 These regions, drawn to coincide with modern national boundaries, are virtually identical to those used in United Nations reports. The Zambezi Valley, in contrast to the others shown in Figure 10.1, includes portions of three regions: Central, Eastern, and Southern Africa.

4 For a more detailed summary of these descriptive points, see Austen (1987).




Figure 10.1 African regions and major rivers
 Map credit: Redrawn based on a map by Patrick Manning.
 Data source: Base map in Eckert IV projection; regions as classified by the author.

consists of savannah in south and east, desert in north and west; millet and maize were the principal crops and cattle were numerous, especially where population was densest in the well-watered regions of the eastern coast. In North Africa, wheat was the principal food crop; cattle, sheep, and goats were herded, along with camels in the extensive desert. Population was densest in the Nile Valley, along the Mediterranean shore, and in the Atlas highlands. In artisanal work, iron and steel ware, pottery, textiles, and leather goods have long been manufactured in most African regions; copper mining and manufacture was prominent in Central Africa. Construction has been in stone, wood, and thatch but mostly in adobe.

African Slavery and Slave Trade, 1700–1870

The export of captives from sub-Saharan Africa to centres of wealth can be traced far back in time, to seizure of captives from the Middle Nile Valley in the days of the Old Kingdom of Egypt. Fifteenth-century Portuguese visitors to West Africa began seizing and purchasing captives, and this new Atlantic slave trade expanded until, by 1650, it exceeded the volume of trans-Saharan slave trade (Manning 1990).

Research in progress is preparing revised estimates of African population and migration, using the best available methodology. These estimates are to provide decennial populations for Africa – by region, sex, age, and free or slave status – for the continent from 1650 to 1950. Table 10.1 provides a compact summary of current estimates for some major variables.⁵ The full range of projections includes volumes of slave exports, levels of enslavement within Africa, and total size of slave populations in Africa and abroad. Of these demographic variables, the levels of capture and the size of enslaved populations are the most difficult to estimate, but the inclusion of such estimates is essential to an understanding of African economies, especially for the nineteenth century. Table 10.1 shows regional populations, the enslaved populations within African regions, and annual export of captives – for the decades of the 1700s, 1790s, and 1870s. These figures show a modest growth in African continental population throughout the two centuries, but show significant population declines for West and Central Africa. The annual number of persons captured and transported from sub-Saharan Africa doubled from 1700 to 1790 then fell back to the earlier level by 1870 – but the enslaved population within Africa grew to more than 10 per cent of the continental total by 1870.⁶ Population in North Africa grew not only because of natural growth but because of the settlement of sub-Saharan captives whose descendants came to comprise at least 10 per cent of the regional population.⁷

More detailed tabulations show the moments of regional peaks in enslavement: the 1790s for West African slave exports,⁷ the 1830s for central African

⁵ These estimates of population and migration rely on analysis by demographic simulation, work that has met delays and is still incomplete. Programming of the simulation requires improvements in the linkage of estimates from one decade to another, especially the estimates of enslaved populations within Africa. The results reported in Table 10.1 are therefore preliminary: Manning et al. (2014–2015); Manning, African Population and Migration Database.

⁶ Estimates of enslaved populations within Africa, necessarily speculative, are now undergoing more systematic analysis.

⁷ For southern Africa in the Dutch era, up to roughly 1800, captives brought to southern Africa were mostly of Asian rather than African origin.

Table 10.1 Total and slave populations, selected decades

Region	1700			1790			1870		
	Pop $\times 10^6$	Est. slave pop $\times 10^6$	Annual slave exports $\times 10^3$	Pop $\times 10^6$	Est. slave pop $\times 10^6$	Annual slave exports $\times 10^3$	Pop $\times 10^6$	Est. slave pop $\times 10^6$	Annual slave exports $\times 10^3$
West	50	1	32	46	2	45	41	5	5
Central	22	0.5	8	17	1	40	19	3	1
Eastern	39	0.5	8	44	2	10	46	6	35
North	17	1	0	23	2	0	29	4	0
Southern	10	0	0	12	0.5	0	10	0.5	0
Continent	138	3	48	141	7.5	95	145	18.5	41

Sources: Eltis et al. (2010); Manning, 'Africa: Slavery and the World Economy', doi.org/10.7910/DVN/COK6XE.

exports, the 1870s for exports from Eastern Africa, and the 1850s–70s for the size of continental slave populations (Manning 1990; Eltis et al. 2010). The directions of transportation of African captives varied considerably by region. West African captives went to the Caribbean, South America, North America, and North Africa. Central African captives went mostly to Brazil, then to the Caribbean and with some to North America. For Eastern Africa, as for West Africa, captives went in many directions: to West Asia, South Asia, North Africa, the Indian Ocean islands, Southern Africa, and to the Caribbean.

The principal demographic results for Africa arising from study of the slave trade are that enslavement limited and reallocated population within Africa, that the African diaspora (in all directions) rose in its aggregate population to some 10 per cent of the continental population by the mid-nineteenth century, and that the enslaved population within Africa grew, especially during the nineteenth century, to more than 10 per cent of the continental population. Regional variations in the impact of enslavement varied significantly: West Africa underwent the longest and most consistent losses; Central Africa experienced serious losses from 1750 to 1850; and Eastern Africa experienced serious losses in the nineteenth century.

Recurring efforts to theorize slavery and the slave trade have led to recent advances, and the increase in available data gives promise of further improvements in theory. Gareth Austin completed a 2005 analysis of slavery in the Asante Kingdom during the nineteenth century, which explored comprehensively the land/labour ratio that has been the subject of much previous analysis, notably by Nieboer (1900) and Domar (1970). H. J. Nieboer, writing in 1900 about slavery among ethnic communities in the nineteenth-century Dutch East Indies, argued that a relative shortage of labour encouraged landowners to engage in enslavement in order to gain low-priced labour for agricultural production. Evsey Domar, writing in 1970 with regard to European serfdom but at the time of an expanding literature on the enslavement of Africans, made similar arguments; A. G. Hopkins (1973: 23–27) drew more explicitly on Nieboer in his economic history of West Africa. Austin (2005: 153–170) applied these frameworks to the specifics of the Asante, using the full range of available prices to gain a sense of the relative prices and elasticities of labour and land. He went further, arguing that politics and culture needed to be added to the analysis, and concluded that slavery was a Hobson's choice within the Asante economy, so that the demand for labour was sufficient to pay for slave labour but not for wages to free labourers. Austin (2005: 170) notes that 'the Nieboer hypothesis is inadequate once the

analysis is extended beyond the borders of the slave-importing economy to include the areas from which the captives came'.

Another line of theorization has sought to go beyond slavery in a domestic economy, to explain the export of slaves from Africa to other regions. This discussion, too, analysed the land/labour ratio, but in different terms. Henry Gemery and Jan S. Hogendorn (1974) proposed a version of the vent-for-surplus model for export commodities: they argued that labour was in relative surplus within Africa, and that the sale of captives to overseas markets enabled the purchase of desired import goods; Gemery and Hogendorn drew inspiration from Myint (1964). Philip Curtin (1979: 15–16) addressed the prices of those initially captured, arguing that they corresponded to 'fencing' – they were held artificially low because the captives were stolen goods that needed to be sold in a hurry. Taking a different approach, Jack Goody (1971: 25) pointed out the technological difference between 'people of the hoe' (in Africa) and 'people of the plough' (on other continents), noting that physical productivity was higher in the latter. Patrick Manning (1990: 33–34) adopted this observation to argue that European slave purchasers in Africa, offering prices based on the productivity of labour in the Americas, were able to outbid African purchasers of labour, free or slave. Stefano Fenoaltea (1999) focused instead on the cost of transportation within Africa: given high costs of head transportation, Africans could purchase imports most easily by selling a commodity that could move itself (though under duress) to the ports.

In sum, while the rise and persistence of enslavement within a given economy has been shown to be susceptible to theorization along lines running from Nieboer to Austin, theorization of the sale of captives from one domestic economy to another, along with the initial seizure of captives, has shown to be relatively intractable. The various hypotheses address quite different aspects of the overall problem of slave trade, and not much work has gone into efforts to link them. But because long-distance slave trade has been a major historical and social issue, and because documentation is growing in quantity and consistency, one may hope for new analyses.

As European powers seized African territories in the Scramble for Africa from the 1880s to the early twentieth century, the new authorities generally had the power to halt slave raiding. With the exception of a few cases, the European powers did not proclaim general emancipation of slaves either on their initial conquest or during their later administration. As a result, the number of persons enslaved in Africa reached a peak in the 1870s and gradually declined until it reached a low level in the 1930s.

Africa: Slavery and the World Economy, 1700–1870




Figure 10.2 Value of sub-Saharan African slave exports in 1913 pounds, by region

Notes and sources: Average annual total value of persons embarked in sub-Saharan Africa for sale as slaves, by decade. Estimated f.o.b. value at African port of dispatch. Prices are Atlantic African f.o.b. prices, as listed in Manning (1982: 332–333). Volume figures are as listed in Manning, 'Africa: Slavery and the World Economy', doi.org/10.7910/DVN/COK6XE.

To facilitate comparisons both within Africa and globally, I offer estimates of the total value of African exports in constant 1913 prices, 1700–1870, distinguishing the value of slave exports from the value of all other commodities. Slave export values are shown in Figure 10.2, with total export values in Figure 10.3. These figures are approximate, but they indicate that the total value of exports from sub-Saharan Africa remained below £4 million sterling for the period up to 1850, and then rose rapidly because of diamond and then gold exports from South Africa.⁸

The values shown in Figure 10.2 reflect what African sellers got out of the external slave trade. The value of enslaved persons in the Atlantic economy overall was much greater, as it included the cost of commodities traded for slaves, the cost of vessels and crews, and especially the productivity of slave workers. In the nineteenth century, the value of 'legitimate trade' from Africa exceeded the value of slave trade only from the 1850s or conceivably from the 1840s.

Implications of African Slavery for Life in Africa and Overseas

The expansion of slavery in early modern and modern times brought transformation to society in all the regions where slavery flourished, and to regions beyond (Manning 1990; Lovejoy 2011). For Africa, the expansion in brutality

⁸ As Munro (1976: 35) notes, J. D. Fage (1969: 91–92) estimated the total trade of West Africa in the eighteenth century (imports plus exports) at £4 million, roughly the same order of magnitude as the exports of slaves for the Atlantic shown in Figure 10.2.




Figure 10.3 Sub-Saharan African annual export value, in £ 1913

Sources and notes: The value of slave exports is as shown in Figure 10.1. For 1700–1800, non-slave export values include English import values from Africa and French import values from Senegal; not included are African exports via Dutch, Portuguese, Indian Ocean or trans-Saharan merchants. Non-slave export values, 1800–70, include West African exports of palm products and groundnuts, East African cloves, and South African wool and diamonds. Not included for 1800–70 are exports of ivory, gum, lumber, cotton, hides, dyes, grains, textiles, and other commodities. Sources: de Kiewiet (1941); Brooks (1975: 34); Curtin (1975: 62–70, 100–101); Manning (1986: 208–209); Sheriff (1987: 62–64); and Johnson (1990). See Manning, 'Africa: Slavery and the World Economy', doi.org/10.79/DVN/COK6XE.

brought by warfare, kidnapping, and other devices for enslavement made for wide disruption. In addition to the recurring seizure and transportation of people of all ages, the gendered, age-specific, and ethnic dimensions of slavery were substantial. Captives traded across the Atlantic included twice as many males as females; the captives were dominantly young adults. As a result, slave populations in the Americas were consistently short of females, while populations in West and Central Africa were consistently short of males. Patterns of marriage and sexual division of labour on each side of the Atlantic were distorted for the whole era of the slave trade. In the Americas, African-descended women had most of their children with African-descended men, so that a distinctive African-descended community remained large. Nevertheless, European men fathered a significant minority of the children of African-descended women: while most of these offspring lived their lives as slaves, some became free and lived in an intermediate caste of colour.

In coastal West Africa and Central Africa, where most of those dispatched were male, the slave trade kept the proportion of adult females well over the normal 50 per cent for two centuries, though with great local variation. Many of these adult women were in slave status, living in isolation from their own families; they had responsibility for the care of their children, but had little say

in the destiny of those same children, who belonged to the fathers. The institution of marriage was undermined as larger numbers of female partners became available to free men, who could now enjoy extended dominance without taking on family responsibilities. Conversely, the slave traders crossing the Indian Ocean and the Sahara transported nearly twice as many females as males. In these cases, slave populations in Eurasia and North Africa were consistently short of males, while populations in Eastern Africa were commonly short of females. In Eurasia and North Africa, the children of most African women were fathered by men of the master class, so there was a steady tendency towards social and biological integration of the Africans into the dominant society – distinctive African communities existed, but remained relatively small (Manning 1990). In Eastern Africa and in interior West Africa, where most of those dispatched were female, the slave trade generated a proportion of adult males over the normal 50 per cent. Many of these men were in slavery, and were liable to execution at any time. African social orders evolved as the slave trade expanded. In coastal West Africa and in Central Africa, the shortage of men meant that women took over tasks that had previously been performed by men. Inversely, in Eastern Africa and in the interior of West Africa, the shortage of women meant that men took over tasks that had previously been performed by women.

The severity and the duration of these social changes depended on the rise and fall in the volume of enslavement. For West Africa, Atlantic slave exports grew at 1 per cent per year throughout the eighteenth century to 60,000 per year, then declined at an average 2 per cent per year for the first half of the nineteenth century. For Central Africa, Atlantic slave exports grew at 1 per cent per year during the eighteenth century to 30,000 per year, remained at that level from 1800 to 1850, then ended suddenly. The export slave trade from East Africa and across the Sahara totalled roughly 15,000 per year for most of the eighteenth century, then rose at 1 per cent per year to 45,000 per year by 1840, remained at that level until 1870, then declined very rapidly. ↘

War and enslavement commonly correlated in Africa. Prior to 1700, African states were not especially warlike – seventeenth-century exceptions were the wars in Senegambia, the Gold Coast, and Kongo. States forming or expanding thereafter relied heavily on war: Asante, Segou, and Dahomey in eighteenth-century West Africa and, in the nineteenth century, Merina in Madagascar, and Bunyoro in Eastern Africa (Thornton 1983; Campbell 2005; Médard and Doyle 2007). The kingdom best known for its wars, the Zulu state (founded 1816), conducted very little trade in slaves. Nevertheless, the response to expanding enslavement was more complex than simple growth

of warfare. In several cases, states carried on campaigns to limit or abolish enslavement, but were eventually drawn back into the prevailing ethos of enslavement. Examples include the kingdoms of Waalo, Benin, and Kongo in the seventeenth century; Asante and Dahomey in the eighteenth century, and the Sokoto Caliphate in the nineteenth century (Akinjogbin 1967; Ryder 1969; Thornton 1983; Barry 1985). Along with the expansion in warfare, refugee populations grew substantially in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries in many parts of the continent: common tactics were the dispersion of populations to mountaintops, forests, and marshes.

With time, practices of enslavement expanded to most areas of the continent. The mechanism of this expansion remains in need of further study. Was it a localized social 'infection', as enslavement in one region caused the practice to be adopted in neighbouring regions? Was it the relentless economic pressure of high and well-funded demand at the coast? Did the dynamic change in some way to bring about the expansion in continental African enslavement during the nineteenth century? The incentives to enslave were such that one knew the price on every head, by age and gender. In this sense, the African continent underwent an extreme monetarization during these two centuries. In the nineteenth century, as enslavement grew within Africa and slave exports declined, the sex ratios among the enslaved tended to even out. This facilitated the development of a new political economy of slavery – one focused on the creation of slaves as an inferior social class in place of attaching them to owners in individual servitude. In the West African savannah, hundreds of 'slave villages' were formed, in which male and female slaves formed family units but worked under the direction of overseers acting on behalf of the owners.⁹

The 'second slavery', focusing on expanding enslavement in the early and mid-nineteenth century, has gained significant attention in recent scholarship. The analysis has emphasized slavery in the United States, Cuba, and Brazil, tied closely to capitalist development, especially from the 1820s to the 1860s (Tomich and Zeuske 2008). At largely the same time, enslavement expanded in the Eastern Hemisphere tropics and semi-tropics. The expansion of slavery in nineteenth-century Africa, long acknowledged but not analysed with care, tended to be treated as simply a spillover effect from the external

⁹ Slave rebellions and the formation of maroon communities took place in Africa as in the diaspora: these are best-documented for the nineteenth century. On slave villages and the constitution of slave social classes, see Mason (1973) and Campbell (2005). On rebellion and emancipation, see Diouf (2003), Alpers et al. (2005), Cooper (1980) and Scully and Paton (2005).

slave trade. But as major studies appeared on the expansion of slavery in the Indonesian archipelago, in Thailand and Burma, in south India, and in the lands of West Asia, there came to be reason to study the expanding enslavement in Africa more carefully (Ewald 1990; Beemer 2013).

Local, Regional, and Global Economic Context

A. G. Hopkins (1973), in his foundational study of West African economic history, relied on the analytical categories of 'domestic economy' and 'external trade' for his analysis: these categories have dominated studies in African economic history ever since, including the present study. The distinction is logical, but the manner of its application has led to distortion in analysis: most studies focus primarily on external trade, even though the domestic economy accounted for the great majority of economic activity. There is an advantage, therefore, to assuming the interplay of several domestic sectors. These can include the sectors of self-sufficient production or foraging (a small sector in the aggregate, but commonly connected to other sectors); a local-exchange sector (including village and regional activities of agriculture, manufacturing, exchange, and consumption, commonly with local moneys); a sector of interregional and continental trade (monetary); and tertiary sectors from local to interregional levels (providing government, exchange of specialized knowledge, and cultural production) (Manning 2014a: 141–142).

For the eighteenth century, the local exchange sector can be addressed through changes in production and production system. One striking case of local transformation is that of the Weme Valley (in modern Benin) where people were driven as refugees by the expansion of Dahomey in the seventeenth century. These settlers gradually built an intensive system of agriculture, relying on the annual flood of the river, which spilled over the banks and fertilized adjoining fields. In succeeding seasons these farmers grew manioc, maize, and beans in the floodplain, as well as crops under rainfall on the plateau. Channels were dug each year to enable waters to re-enter the rivercourse; fish were held in these ditches and then harvested once a year; cattle were kept in island pens during the flood season. These peasants participated in a network of markets organized on a four-day calendar, and in the nineteenth century they added production and sale of palm oil to their activities (Manning 1982: 87).

In other transformations, artisanal production grew in the villages of Gold Coast during the seventeenth century, in association with the expanding gold trade, but late in the century an expansion of warfare and firearms exports

brought growth in slave exports and a decline in artisanal production. The increase in prices of slaves at the opening of the eighteenth century was such that gold came to be imported (from Brazil) in exchange for slaves, reversing previous flows (Kea 1982). Meanwhile, commercial flows in the interior, relying on the institution of the trade diaspora, moved commodities among centres of population. In West Africa, kola nuts, consumed as a stimulant, were transported in caravans from Asante through the market centre at Salaga to the commercial metropolis of Kano. In Central Africa, trade routes focused on Malebo Pool on the lower Congo, while in East Africa commercial routes centred on Lake Victoria; Egyptian grains and Ethiopian coffee flowed to Marseille and Istanbul through Alexandria (Issawi 1947; Gray and Birmingham 1970; Martin 1972; Curtin 1975; Gran 1979; Lovejoy 1980; Issawi 1982). Textiles were produced and exchanged throughout the continent, relying on cotton in West Africa and Eastern Africa, while fibre from the raffia palm was woven throughout Central Africa. The principal African import in exchange for slaves was textiles, including some European wools but mostly Indian cottons; English cottons began to replace Indian textiles in the nineteenth century. The interplay of domestic and imported textiles in various African regions is an issue requiring further study (Martin 1972; 1987; Kriger 2006; Kobayashi 2018).

It is useful to compare continental histories of colonialism, to see where Africa fits in. On one side were the Americas, where conquest and colonization came early – a chapter that ended by 1830 with independence for the mainland territories – although the rest of the Caribbean (except Hispaniola) remained under colonial rule until the twentieth century. The other major early colonization was that of the Ottomans and their sixteenth-century colonial occupation of the Arab Middle East, the Balkans, and most of North Africa; the Ottomans held North Africa until the nineteenth century.

For most of Asia and for Africa except for the Mediterranean littoral, local economies participated in maritime trade not through colonization but through trading posts, well into the nineteenth century. The biggest exception was India, which had fallen fully under British sway by 1818; in addition, the Dutch gained control of key territories in the East Indies. Africa and the rest of the eastern hemisphere, while long escaping direct colonization, still shared experiences of empire: the wars among imperial powers and the shifts in great-power commercial policy. Coastal trading posts changed hands among the Portuguese, Dutch, French, English, and Danish during the War of Austrian Succession, the Seven Years War, the American Revolution, and the Napoleonic Wars. Parallel

global influences radiated, in the nineteenth century, from the British abolition of oceanic slave trade, British free trade policy, and the gold standard, not to mention the Opium War, the 1848 revolutions, and the great triad of mid-century social upheavals – the Indian Rebellion of 1857, the Taiping Revolt, and the American Civil War. The latter had an unmistakable impact on Africa, in that production and export of cotton rose dramatically, if briefly, in Egypt and Angola.

Only Portugal governed substantial African territory, in Angola. Other African lands interacted with European economies in different ways. As Joseph Inikori (2002) has argued, African labourers and consumers, both at home and under English rule in the diaspora, contributed substantially to the Industrial Revolution in England through the instrument of the British Empire. Inikori, working under the premise that English industrial growth arose primarily out of external trade rather than from the domestic market, argues that African labourers produced essential raw materials for industry (in Africa as well as in the Americas) and, in addition, consumed the produce of English industry.

The range of commodities exported from Africa grew in the nineteenth century, beyond the Central African beeswax, Senegambian gum, and Ethiopian coffee of the eighteenth century. This shift was signalled by the rising exports of palm oil from the Niger Delta, then followed by the spread of palm oil exports along much of the West African coast, and by the subsequent expansion of palm kernels from the same source. Soon thereafter, exports of groundnuts from Senegambia began a steady increase, while clove production expanded on the island of Zanzibar. For all these commodities, slave labour was important in production, though independent peasants also participated in exports. Cocoa, brought from Venezuela to the Spanish-controlled island of Fernando Po, was then planted in Gold Coast, where the cocoa industry grew for several decades before reaching its peak. The expanding ivory market brought great quantities of elephant tusks to the Indian Ocean coast, principally for sale in India. Woollens exported from South Africa sometimes reached the value of palm oil from West Africa (Dike 1956; Meillassoux 1971; Houghton 1975; Gutkind et al. 1978; Manning 1982; Coquery-Vidrovitch and Lovejoy 1985; Iliffe 1987; Manning 1997; Kriger 1999; Austin 2005; Campbell 2005).

Silver currency grew rapidly in importance throughout the continent. This appears to have depended in part on shifts in silver flows after the end of Spanish control of the mines, and on the growing importance of London as a financial centre. Another factor important for West Africa was that, in the era of illegal slave trade, transactions had to be made rapidly, so that oceanic

merchants purchased slaves quickly with silver coin instead of the previous complex packages of imported goods. Gujarati merchants in Mozambique exchanged silver sent from Brazil, slaves from Africa, and textiles from Gujarat (Machado 2014). As of 1850, steam shippers opened regular service to the West African coast: their dependable schedules transformed the patterns of trade. German merchants imported great quantities of cowrie shells from the East African coast and exchanged them in West Africa for palm products. Maritime workers of Kru ethnicity signed on to the steamers in Sierra Leone, worked on voyages that went to the mouths of the Niger or the Congo, and collected their pay as they were dropped off on the return trip (Brooks 1972).

The political economy of the African continent underwent numerous and contradictory changes during the nineteenth century. The expansion in continental slavery brought widespread disruption and militarization of the continent, yet it concentrated wealth in the hands of elites and expanded commerce in certain commodities. While the export slave trade continued, migrants came to Africa from various directions: returnees from the African diaspora of the Americas, merchants and indentured workers from India, and European settlers in Algeria and South Africa. Where slavery declined, ex-slaves formed themselves into peasant communities, some of which prospered. Systems of money and credit changed. It is difficult to know whether the positive or negative changes predominated, within each region and especially for the continent as a whole. In any case the African continent, with this complex and contradictory heritage, was next to face an even bigger set of changes as European conquest and formal colonial rule began after 1870 (Rodney 1972; Munro 1976; Manning 1982; Hogendorn and Johnson 1986; Sheriff 1987; Inikori 2002; Manning 2006; Prestholdt 2008).

Growth and Decline, 1700–1870

The issue of economic growth, while it has been discussed less fully for Africa than for other world regions in the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries, remains an issue of relevance. The reluctance of economic policymakers to consider African historical patterns is gradually giving way to a lively interest in African economic history. This chapter concludes by summarizing available theses on economic growth in Africa, most of them advanced some time ago, in the hope that the current relaunch of African economic history will bring a more robust exploration of African economic growth.

A. G. Hopkins (1973: 123), implicitly assuming that economic growth was unlikely without significant external contact, concluded that international trade did not serve as an engine of growth for precolonial Africa. As he saw it the export sector – whether in slaves or in agricultural commodities – was small and weakly linked to the domestic economy.¹⁰ To illustrate such weak links, he proposed a parallel of precolonial African trade to the enclave economies of the postcolonial era, in which there is substantial remittance of profits overseas.¹¹ Manning (1982), in contrast, assumed that domestic economies might lead in a ‘mechanism of accumulation’ producing growth as long as external factors did not counterbalance domestic investment, providing empirical estimates of export revenue and the links of external and domestic economies for the period 1640–1960 in the region of southern Bénin Republic.¹² Ralph Austen (1987: 268–271), in a long-term interpretation of African economic history, draws on both of these approaches as he observes a pairing of autonomy in African economic life and marginalization in African links to the world, so that periodic episodes of African economic brilliance arose, but that ‘direct exposure to world oceanic trade . . . provided little incentive for intensification of productive technology and organization’. Further, in a demographic approach to growth, Manning estimated rough stasis in African population from 1700 to 1900, in contrast to estimates such as that of Maddison (2001: 175, 183), which propose steady growth in African population through the whole era of slave trade.¹³

To clarify rates of precolonial African economic growth, we need estimates of aggregate domestic income, population estimates, and detailed narratives of regional economic change. Since study of the economic history of Africa is now integrated increasingly into economic history generally, there is hope that the relevant data collection, analysis, and linkage of issues within the continent and externally may now advance substantially.

¹⁰ A notable predecessor to Hopkins was Allan McPhee, whose 1926 analysis argued, more optimistically, that British government and international trade opportunities had caused rapid growth in British West Africa. See McPhee (1971) [1926]; Hopkins (1973: 119–123).

¹¹ On remittance of profits and its limitation of African national income in postcolonial years, see Manning and Drwenski (2016).

¹² Philip Curtin (1975) made similar arguments for a shorter period for Senegambia; Donald Wright (2010) made parallel arguments for the much smaller region of Niimi, Gambia.

¹³ Maddison proposed an African population rising from 61 million in 1700 to 123 million in 1913, as compared with roughly 140 million estimated by Manning for 1700 to 1900. See Manning (1990); Manning (2010); Manning (2014a).

References

- Akinjogbin, I. A. (1967). *Dahomey and its Neighbours, 1708–1818*, Cambridge University Press.
- Alpers, E. A., Campbell, G. and Salman, M. (eds.) (2005). *Slavery and Resistance in Africa and Asia*, London: Routledge.
- Austen, R. (1987). *African Economic History: Internal Development and External Dependency*, London: James Currey.
- Austin, G. (2005). *Labour, Land and Capital in Ghana: From Slavery to Free Labour in Asante, 1807–1956*, University of Rochester Press.
- Barry, B. (1985). *Le Royaume du Waalo: Le Sénégal avant la conquête*, rev. ed., Paris: Karthala.
- Beemer, B. (2013). 'The Creole City in Mainland Southeast Asia: Slave Gathering, Warfare and Cultural Exchange in Burma, Thailand and Manipur, 18th–19th C', unpublished Ph.D. thesis, University of Hawai'i.
- Brooks, G. E., Jr. (1972). *The Kru Mariner in the Nineteenth Century: An Historical Compendium* (Newark: University of Delaware Department of Anthropology).
- Brooks, G. E. (1975). 'Peanuts and Colonialism: Consequences of the Commercialization of Peanuts in West Africa, 1830–70', *Journal of African History*, 16, 29–54.
- Campbell, G. (2005). *An Economic History of Imperial Madagascar, 1750–1895: The Rise and Fall of an Island Empire*, Cambridge University Press.
- Cooper, F. (1980). *From Slaves to Squatters: Plantation Labor and Agriculture in Zanzibar and Coastal Kenya, 1890–1925*, New Haven: Yale University Press.
- Coquery-Vidrovitch, C. and Lovejoy, P. E. (eds.) (1985). *The Workers of African Trade*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Curtin, P. D. (1975). *Economic Change in Precolonial Africa: Senegambia in the Era of the Slave Trade, Supplementary Evidence*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- (1979). 'The African Diaspora', in Craton, M. (ed.), *Roots and Branches: Current Directions in Slave Studies*, papers presented at a conference entitled 'Slave Studies: Directions in Current Scholarship', held in Waterloo, Ontario in March 1979.
- de Kiewiet, C. W. (1941). *History of South Africa, Social and Economic*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Dike, K. O. (1956). *Trade and Politics in the Niger Delta, 1830–1895*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- Diouf, S. (2003). *Fighting the Slave Trade: West African Strategies*, Athens: Ohio University Press.
- Domar, E. D. (1970). 'The Causes of Slavery or Serfdom: a Hypothesis', *Journal of Economic History*, 30, 18–32.
- Eltis, D. et al. (2010). 'Slave Voyages: The Transatlantic Slave Trade Database', slavevoyages.org (accessed 30 September 2020).
- Ewald, J. J. (1990). *Soldiers, Traders, and Slaves: State Formation and Economic Transformation in the Greater Nile Valley, 1700–1885*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Fage, J. D. (1969). *A History of West Africa*, Cambridge University Press.
- Fenoaltea, S. (1999). 'Europe in the African Mirror: The Slave Trade and the Rise of Feudalism', *Rivista di Storia Economica*, 15, 123–165.
- Gemery, H. A. and Hogendorn, J. S. (1974). 'The Atlantic Slave Trade: A Tentative Economic Model', *Journal of African History*, 15, 233–246.
- Goody, J. (1971). *Technology, Tradition, and the State in Africa*, Cambridge University Press.
- Gran, P. (1979). *Islamic Roots of Capitalism: Egypt, 1760–1840*, Austin: University of Texas Press.
- Gray, R. and Birmingham, D. (1970). *Pre-colonial African Trade: Essays on Trade in Central and Eastern Africa Before 1900*, Oxford University Press.
- Gutkind, P. C. W., Cohen, R. and Copans, J. (eds.) (1978). *African Labor History*, Beverly Hills: Sage Publications.
- Hogendorn, J. S. and Johnson, M. (1986). *Shell Money of the Slave Trade*, Cambridge University Press.
- Hopkins, A. G. (1973). *An Economic History of West Africa*, London: Longman.
- Houghton, D. H. (1975). *The South African Economy*, 4th ed., Oxford University Press.
- Iliffe, J. (1987). *The African Poor: A History*, Cambridge University Press.
- Inikori, J. E. (2002). *Africans and the Industrial Revolution in England: A Study in International Trade and Economic Development*, Cambridge University Press.
- Issawi, C. (1947). *Egypt: An Economic and Social Analysis*, Oxford University Press.
- (1982). *An Economic History of the Middle East and North Africa*, New York: Columbia University Press.
- Johnson, M. (1990). *Anglo-African Trade in the Eighteenth Century: English Statistics on African Trade 1699–1808* (edited by Thomas Lindblad, J. and Ross, R.), Leiden: Centre for the History of European Expansion.
- Kea, R. A. (1982). *Settlements, Trade and Politics in the Seventeenth-Century Gold Coast*, Baltimore: Johns Hopkins University Press.
- Kobayashi, K. (2018). 'The British Atlantic Slave Trade and Indian Cotton Textiles: The Case of Thomas Lumley and Co.', in Shiroyama, T. (ed.), *Modern Global Trade and the Asian Regional Economy*, Singapore: Springer, 59–85.
- Kruger, C. (1999). *Pride of Men: Ironworking in 19th-Century West Central Africa*, Portsmouth, NH: Heinemann.
- (2006). *Cloth in West African History* (Lanham, MD: AltaMira Press).
- LeVeen, E. P. (1977). *British Slave Trade Suppression Policies, 1821–1865*, New York: Arno Press.
- Lovejoy, P. E. (1980). *Caravans of Kola: The Hausa Kola Trade, 1700–1900*, Zaria: Ahmadu Bello University Press.
- (2011). *Transformations in Slavery: A History of Slavery in Africa*, 3rd ed., Cambridge University Press.
- Machado, P. (2014). *Oceans of Trade: South Asian Merchants, Africa, and the Indian Ocean, c.1750–1850*, Cambridge University Press.
- Maddison, A. (2001). *The World Economy: A Millennial Perspective*, Paris: Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development.
- Manning, P. (1982). *Slavery, Colonialism and Economic Growth in Dahomey, 1640–1960*, Cambridge University Press.
- (1986). 'Slave Trade, "Legitimate" Trade, and Imperialism Revisited: The Control of Wealth in the Bights of Benin and Biafra', in Lovejoy, P. E. (ed.), *Africans in Bondage: Studies in Slavery and the Slave Trade*, Madison: African Studies Program, University of Wisconsin, 203–233.
- (1990). *Slavery and African Life: Occidental, Oriental, and African Slave Trades*, Cambridge University Press.
- (2006). 'African Connections with American Colonization, 1400–1850', in Bulmer-Thomas, V. and Coatsworth, J. (eds.), *The Cambridge Economic History of Latin America*, Cambridge University Press, 43–71.

- (2014a). 'Africa's Place in Globalization: Africa, Eurasia, and their Borderlands', *Journal of Globalization Studies*, 59(1), 65-81.
- (2014b). 'African Population, 1650-2000: Comparisons and Implications of New Estimates', in Akyeampong, E., Bates, R. H., Nunn, N. and Robinson, J. A. (eds.), *Africa's Development: in Historical Perspective*, Cambridge University Press, 131-150.
- African Population and Migration Dataverse, dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/WH_AfricanPopMigration.
- Manning, P. and Drwenski, M. (2016). 'The Differences of Inequality in Africa', in Hudson, P. and Tribe, K. (eds.), *The Contradictions of Capital in the Twenty-First Century: The Piketty Opportunity*, Newcastle upon Tyne: Agenda Publishing, 207-222.
- Manning, P., Nickleach, S., Yi, B. and McGill, B. (2014-2015). 'Demographic Models for Projecting Population and Migration: Methods for African Historical Analysis', *Journal of World-Historical Information*, 2-3(1), 23-39.
- Martin, P. M. (1972). *The External Trade of the Loango Coast, 1576-1870: The Effects of Changing Commercial Relations*, Oxford: Clarendon Press.
- (1987). 'Power, Cloth and Currency on the Loango Coast', *African Economic History*, 15, 1-12.
- Mason, M. (1973). 'Captive and Client Labour and the Economy of the Bida Emirate, 1857-1901', *Journal of African History*, 14, 453-471.
- McPhee, A. (1971) [1926]. *The Economic Revolution in British West Africa*, 2nd ed., with an introduction by Anthony G. Hopkins, London: Frank Cass.
- Médard, H. and Doyle, S. (eds.) (2007). *Slavery in the Great Lakes Region of East Africa*, Oxford: James Currey.
- Meillassoux, C. (ed.) (1971). *The Development of Indigenous Trade and Markets in West Africa*, Oxford University Press.
- Munro, J. F. (1976). *Africa and the International Economy 1800-1960*, Totowa, NJ: Rowman and Littlefield.
- Myint, H. (1964). *The Economics of the Developing Countries*, London: Hutchinson.
- Nieboer, H. J. (1900). *Slavery as an Industrial System*. The Hague: M. Nijhoff.
- Prestholdt, J. (2008). *Domesticating the World: African Consumerism and the Genealogies of Globalization*, Cambridge University Press.
- Rodney, W. (1972). *How Europe Underdeveloped Africa*, London: Bogle-L'Ouverture Publications.
- Ryder, A. F. C. (1969). *Benin and the Europeans, 1485-1897*, Harlow: Longmans.
- Scully, P. and Paton, D. (eds.) (2005). *Gender and Slave Emancipation in the Atlantic World*, Durham, NC: Duke University Press.
- Sheriff, A. (1987). *Slaves, Spices, and Ivory in Zanzibar: Integration of an East African Commercial Empire into the World Economy, 1770-1873*, London: James Currey.
- Thornton, J. K. (1983). *The Kingdom of Kongo: Civil War and Transition, 1641-1718*, Madison: University of Wisconsin Press.
- Tomich, D. and Zeuske, M. (eds.) (2008). 'Introduction, the Second Slavery: Mass Slavery, World-Economy, and Comparative Microhistories', *Review*, 31, 91-100.
- Wright, D. (2010). *The World and a Very Small Place in Africa: A History of Globalization in Niimi, the Gambia*, 3rd ed., Armonk, NY: M. E. Sharpe.