

The Atlantic and Africa

The Second Slavery and Beyond

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Chapter 9

The “Second Slavery” in Africa

Migration and Political Economy in the Nineteenth Century

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In studies of African population and migration from the fifteenth to the twentieth century, estimates for the nineteenth century have emerged as a set of problems of particular interest and complexity. For the era before 1800, the retention of captives in Africa was overwhelmingly as a by-product of the export slave trade; as a result, the number of enslaved people in Africa was relatively modest, and it grew at roughly the same rate as the export slave trade (Manning et al. 2014–2015, 2014, 2010, 1990). During the nineteenth century, however, waves of enslavement developed in many parts of Africa, and such enslavement had steadily less and less to do with the export slave trade, especially as the latter declined sharply after 1850.¹

For the past several decades of active research on African enslavement, it has been understood that continental enslavement grew significantly during the nineteenth century, only to decline (but not to disappear) with European colonization as the twentieth century opened. There were some very rough estimates of the overall magnitude of African slavery during the 1980s (Manning 1981; Inikori 1982; Lovejoy 1989). Thereafter, efforts to trace the magnitude of slave population have taken place at regional and local levels but not at a continental level because of the overall shortage and inconsistency of records. Yet the regional studies have

accumulated impressively with time, and there is now a stronger base for assembling them and beginning to build a continental interpretation.

In addition to these advances in the supply of data on African enslavement, the demand for data on African enslavement has also grown as part of the expanded collection of data on early modern population and economies. The debates on global economic and demographic history are bringing steadily more insistent questions on where Africa fit into the global picture at regional and continental levels.² As a result, it is now clear that the estimation of African population and migration for the nineteenth century requires explicit and quantitative estimates of the number of people captured and held in slavery for each African region and over time.³

This preliminary review of enslavement within nineteenth-century Africa is mainly qualitative, with only a few estimates of the numbers and proportions of people enslaved at the aggregate level. Even at the introductory level of this qualitative approach, it seems clear that there was an African “second slavery,” roughly parallel in time to the nineteenth-century expansions in enslavement in the Americas, in North Africa and the Middle East, and in South and Southeast Asia. Given the size of Africa and its continental population of roughly 140 million (and a population of roughly 110 million in regions in which people were captured), it is likely that the number of persons living in slavery in Africa exceeded that of any of the other regions, especially for the period after 1850 and perhaps even before that date (Manning 2014, 132).

While the literature confirms the demographic significance of nineteenth-century African slavery, that same literature has been vague on the political economy or the “business model” of such enslavement. What ambitions and benefits set the initiative and the timing of those who seized, sold, and exploited so many people as slaves? How does this pattern fit with broad changes in African economies and with shifting patterns of the global economy? Individual authors have offered insights of interest, but there is not yet a general discussion.⁴

This chapter presents an introductory overview of two big questions. First, it sketches narratives, both regional and continental, of the rise and decline of enslavement in nineteenth-century Africa. I assemble these narratives from major regional accounts of enslavement. I proceed in counterclockwise direction around the continent, beginning in Southeast Africa and ending up in West Central Africa. The chronology is not deeply specific—I start in 1780 and end in 1900, separating the periods before and after 1850 rather clearly, and at times divide the first half-century period into segments at 1820 and the second half century

at 1880. In the course of the narrative I ask, especially, when and how big were the changes in levels of enslavement?

Second, the chapter offers initial speculations as to the motives, functions, and consequences of the expanded enslavement as it is presented in the narrative. Most broadly, this is the question of the “business model” of Africa’s second slavery—its socioeconomic design and profitability. This broad question breaks down into specific questions such as:

- What were the ties of continental enslavement to external markets—both the demand for slaves and the demand for slave-produced goods such as palm oil, cloves, peanuts, cotton, and leather goods?
- In what instances were slave systems largely independent of external links?
- Were expanding slave systems tied to an expanding local elite? If so, what was the reason for elite expansion at this time?
- Did markets for land grow along with the growth in enslavement?
- What was the impact of enslavement on longer-term economic stability and growth?

Southeast Africa

By the 1780s, French planters on the Mascarenes were greatly expanding slave purchases from Southeast Africa and Madagascar (Allen 2014, 72–84). In 1790 the Kingdom of Imerina unified, exporting slaves in exchange for arms to facilitate expansion. But the export of slaves seems also to have increased the size of the enslaved population held in Imerina. Then, from 1820 to 1825, Imerina first halted slave exports in alliance with Britain; then Imerina broke the alliance, setting up an autarkic regime, during the period 1825–1850. Enslavement expanded in the era of autarky to serve the Merina elite; at the same time, *corvée* labor (*fanampoana*) was required for plantation labor. Campbell cites an estimate that, in 1817, one-third of the Merina population was in slavery, and half of those were captives rather than born into slavery. The slave population remained stable after 1830. Female slaves were highly valued; highland women were prized in the Muslim Comoros. But Imerina occupied only one-third of Madagascar. To the west, the Sakalava kingdoms participated in exchange of slaves and provisions with

Mozambique. Campbell estimates that, from 1801 to 1891, 290,000 captives were exported from Madagascar; and that, from 1820 to 1891, 400,000 were imported to Madagascar. With the French conquest, 500,000 slaves were liberated in 1896, comprising 20–26 percent of Madagascar's population.⁵ The 1899 French census showed 778 males per 1,000 females on the island.

East Africa

Export slave trade from the Swahili coast to the Persian Gulf expanded from about 1780. Clove plantations on Zanzibar and then Pemba began in roughly 1810; the volume of output and enslavement grew to the 1860s, then declined in the 1870s and 1880s (Sheriff 1987). Sheriff shows annual exports of some seventeen thousand captives from Kilwa in the 1860s, mostly to Zanzibar, with some redistribution to Pemba and the mainland. Thus, market-oriented enslavement was intense in those areas to the end of the century. Ivory trade drawing on the interior—the Great Lakes and the upper Congo Valley—expanded from the 1850s. One has a sense of substantial interior transformations resulting from ivory trade, but we have little detail on the number enslaved (Farrant 1975).

Bunyoro

Bunyoro was the leading kingdom of the Great Lakes region in the eighteenth century. Its political influence expanded late in the century, accompanied by growing enslavement; there seem to have been few external links to this enslavement (Doyle 2007, 235–45). From the 1820s the Egyptian-based Turkiyya forces expanded into the Upper Nile region, seizing and purchasing slaves. A description of Bunyoro for the nineteenth century shows two castes: elite cattle-keepers and a lower agricultural caste. Slaves and lower-caste people were not well distinguished from each other in such reports. But elite families gained in independence from the monarchy and were able to win control of more slaves. Nyoro tradition included three categories of slaves: those in society without masters, war captives, and slaves purchased from neighboring states. Female slaves could be married without bridewealth, and they were reputed to have higher fertility than Nyoro wives. From the 1840s to 1870, Bunyoro suffered at the hands of expanding Buganda. From 1871, however, King Kabalega centralized Bunyoro and reversed the terms of the relationship with Buganda. As for the export slave trade from Bunyoro, one may say that it grew

from 1780 to 1820, declined from 1820 to 1850, rose from 1850 to 1880, and declined in the 1890s.

Nile Valley

Taqali, a Muslim-ruled state in the Nuba hills of Kordofan, was populated mainly by independent farmers. In the last half of the eighteenth century, merchants from Sinnar (to the northeast) and Dar Fur (northwest) came to Kordofan. In 1820–1821, Muhammad Ali's Turco-Egyptian army defeated Sinnar and the Fur governors of Kordofan, opening an era of slave raiding in which Turkiyya soldiers and merchants went even into the Congo watershed, collecting slaves. The Taqali Kingdom held out in its hills yet suffered from Turkiyya slave raids (Ewald 2000). In 1883 the Turkiyya outpost in Kordofan fell to the Mahdiyya, which had arisen in 1881 under the leadership of Muhammad Ahmad. The Mahdiyya ruled the whole region until 1898, collecting many captives and exploiting them within their




Figure 9.1 Central Sudan and the Bights. Source: Courtesy of Henry B. Lovejoy, *African Diaspora Maps*, 2016.

Sudanese realm. Land ownership was a key factor in Taqali and throughout the region. It seems that the number of enslaved held in Taqali did not grow greatly, though the number of captures was significant and the slave population of the overall region grew to a high level, especially during the Mahdiyya. As for the export slave trade from Taqali, it grew from 1820 to 1850 then leveled off; those enslaved from 1883 to 1898 were held within the region.

Central Sudan

The jihad led by Usuman dan Fodio, 1804–1808, brought the creation of the Sokoto Caliphate, which rapidly expanded eastward into Adamawa. Enslavement rose rapidly with conquest and continued thereafter; captives were seized from within the realm of the caliphate and were mostly settled on lands in the caliphate. (See Figure 9.1 for a map of the caliphate and surrounding regions.) The caliphate maintained an elaborate hierarchy and considerable stability to the 1890s, enabling institutionalization of textile and leather industries. Surrounding the substantial cities of the caliphate were plantations for production of grains. Paul Lovejoy argues that there was an effort to enslave but keep slaves in the caliphate rather than send them across the Atlantic (Lovejoy 1978). He estimates a slave population of 1.25–2.5 million in 1900, 25–50 percent of the total population. As for the export slave trade from the Sokoto Caliphate, it grew from 1780 to 1820, selling more to the north and across the desert than to the Atlantic (Lovejoy 1989). Export slave trade to the Atlantic expanded from the 1820s and halted by 1850; trade to the north declined in the 1870s.

Western Sudan

Atlantic exports of slaves from Senegambia fell below five thousand per decade in the 1830s; slave exports from Sierra Leone did not fall to that level until the 1850s (Manning and Liu 2020). The Inner Delta state of Masina under Shehu Ahmadu lasted from 1818 to 1862 and thus had half a century to institutionalize itself. There was less time for stabilization in the regime of Umar (who led in conquests from 1860 to his death in 1864, though his son sustained the regime into the 1890s). Time was even shorter for Samori Touré, who founded a kingdom in Guinea in the 1880s and moved it to the east under attacks from the French until 1898. Martin Klein estimates the level of enslavement in the Western Sudan

at 1.7 million in 1900 (1998). The proportion enslaved ranged from 20 percent in Haut-Sénégal-Niger (Umar's realm) to 50 percent in Guinée (Samori's realm). Senegal and Gambia became regions in which many slaves were settled down to grow peanuts for export, increasingly under the Mourides of Ahmadou Bamba from 1883. There may have been time for stabilization of institutions of slavery in the realm of Ahmadu in Masina (and perhaps earlier in the Bambara state of Segu), but the shifts in enslavement in late nineteenth-century Western Sudan appear to have been chaotic (Klein 1998; Meillassoux 1986).

West African Coast

As the border state of Ilorin rebelled against the Oyo Empire in 1823 and became an emirate within the Sokoto Caliphate, Oyo's eventual collapse brought a long series of wars among Yoruba-speaking peoples. These wars brought the period of greatest export of Yoruba slaves, from the 1820s to the 1850s; yet war and enslavement continued in the region to 1893. The Kingdom of Dahomey continued slave raiding up to 1890, exporting slaves across the Atlantic to the 1860s, but also settled large numbers of slaves from the 1820s on, including for production of palm oil for export (Manning 1982, 45–50, 335–39). For coastal Fante and inland Asante, slave exports virtually ended in 1808. Asante sustained enslavement, and it conquered Fante from 1807 to the 1820s. Rebecca Shumway notes that Fante elites turned away from slaveholding from the 1820s to the 1850s—but when the British lost interest in Fante allies, Fante elites again invested in slaves.⁶ For the Bight of Benin, export slave trade persisted, although at a slightly reduced level, until it declined sharply in the 1850s and ended by 1880.

West Central Africa

Nineteenth-century Atlantic exports of captives grew to a very high level—from the 1820s through 1840s to Brazil, and to Cuba in the 1850s (Manning and Liu 2018). West Central Africa had low levels of population density, large distances for travel of captives, and its regions extended all the way to such other regions of heavy enslavement as Southeast Africa, West Africa, the Nile Valley, and North Central Africa. It is certain that regional population declined significantly during the nineteenth century.⁷ Cotton plantations are known for Angola, especially during the US Civil War, but otherwise not much is known about enslavement. The

actions of the Congo Free State from 1885 and of the expanding Angolan colony clearly involved enslavement. As for West Central Africa, slave exports reached very high levels up to 1850.

Quantitative Summary

For a continental population of 140 million, or roughly 110 million in the area susceptible to enslavement, 20 percent enslavement would mean 20 million in slavery. (For the United States in 1860 the slave population was 4 million, some 13 percent of the total US population.) It is certain that there had been a huge expansion in Africa's enslaved population since 1750. The total population of the continent changed little, so the 1750 population of enslaved would have been 5 million (assuming a 5 percent proportion) or 3 million (assuming a 3 percent proportion). African slave populations of 3 to 5 million would have been roughly equal to the expatriate slave population in the Americas and Eurasia.

Implications: African Slavery in the World Economy

The interpretation of slavery in the Americas, sustained by slave trade from Africa, has focused on its place within the capitalist economy of the Atlantic and the modern world-system. The debate of the 1970s and 1980s on the profitability of the slave trade, while somewhat inconclusive, was carried out within that framework (Solow and Engerman 1987). Can this market- and export-focused logic be extended to African enslavement of the nineteenth century—that is, was African slavery primarily commercial in motivation? If so, was it tied to the world economy overall, to the capitalist economy based in Europe, or to African economic aims? Alternatively, did a different political economy arise in nineteenth-century Africa, emphasizing social rather than economic benefits of holding slaves?

Indeed, we do find links to intercontinental slave trade in almost all the cases of expanding African slavery—even in Bunyoro, Taqali, and the Sokoto Caliphate. (Trade in slave-produced goods took place in Zanzibar, Sokoto, and along the West African coast but not necessarily elsewhere.) At the same time, the apparent expansion of elite strata in the nineteenth century and their interest in holding slaves to relieve them of work suggests that another motivation—more about social

status than about economic profit—was at least supplementary to capitalism and perhaps independent of it. During the seventeenth and eighteenth centuries, African enslavement expanded in a regular relationship with the expansion of overseas slave trade—roughly equal numbers of captives maintained in Africa and sent overseas. In the nineteenth century, however, captives maintained in Africa were far more numerous than those sent overseas, and the ups and downs of continental enslavement did not fit neatly with overseas trade.

The rise and decline of large-scale enslavement on the African mainland was a relatively rapid set of transformations, rarely longer than a century. At the same time, such an expansion in enslavement must have brought implications—presumably negative—for the long-term stability and growth of African economies. Up to the present, however, the “second slavery” has hardly been given any consideration in Africa's economic history. For instance, Nathan Nunn and Leonard Wantchekon, working in the “reversal of fortune” paradigm, have completed widely cited analyses of the impact of slave trade on West Africa but have limited their analysis to a two-point study, comparing volumes of eighteenth-century slave trade to twentieth-century economic and social indicators (Nunn and Wantchekon 2011). It seems reasonable to argue that nineteenth-century enslavement might also have been significant in the long-term trajectory of West African social change. The relationship between slavery and land tenure may be important in helping determine whether slavery was focused on continental or external interests. Was it the case that a land market expanded in nineteenth-century Africa as slaveholders sought properties on which to settle the laborers they controlled? A parallel question may be posed for the end of the second slavery. Of those who had been enslaved during the nineteenth century and who gained some measure of freedom in the twentieth century, how many were able to gain access to or ownership of land? That is, how many former slaves were able to establish an existence as peasants?

The African slave system of the nineteenth century was ephemeral, constrained by shortages in the number of prospective captives and ultimately by imperial European restrictions on enslavement. A class of slave merchants rose and fell, followed by the rise and fall of classes of landowners and slave-owners. Classes of slaves emerged but later became serfs, peasants, or townspeople. While we have yet to develop detailed regional and continental narratives of the transformations in African slavery, the following milestones stand out, at least in approximate terms:⁸

- 1650—Slave exports to Americas began to exceed slave exports to Mediterranean, Arabia, and Indian Ocean
- 1700—Slave population in Americas exceeded that in Africa and in the East
- 1780—Slave population in the East grew until 1870, then declined
- 1850—Slave population in Africa exceeded that in Americas and in the East
- 1880—African slave population began to decline
- 1930—Slavery was declared by colonial rulers to have ended in Africa, though it had not in fact ended (Lugard 1933)

Based on this preliminary survey, it appears that a second slavery arose or accelerated at much the same time in a wide range of tropical and subtropical regions, from the 1820s—in the Americas, Africa, the Middle East and North Africa, Southeast Asia, and perhaps India (Tomich and Zeuske 2008; Ewald 2000; Beemer 2013). Before leaping to conclusions, however, we must compare descriptions of the various regional processes so as to confirm or reject the similarity of their timing and institutional character. If it does turn out to be the case that these expansions of slavery are similar in timing or closely linked, that would raise the issue of a possible common causation. Based on the levels of description that are available at present, it seems certain that the relevant factors included more than simple movements of prices and trade flows linked directly to Europe. What was the demography of enslavement—age and sex composition of captives, mortality rates in capture and in slave status? To the degree that there was emancipation or escape, what were the next steps of ex-slaves? I would venture that we should be on the lookout for types of global interaction that are as much social as economic in nature. They would need to be conveyed at some level by processes moving from region to region.

Notes

1. Research continues to advance knowledge on the volume and timing of Africa's export slave trade. For the Indian Ocean, see Allen (2014); for the Atlantic, see new estimates based on Eltis (<http://www.slavevoyages.org>) in Manning and Liu (2018).
2. Recent meetings of the World Economic History Congress (Kyoto 2015, Boston 2018) have included significant attention to population and economic data worldwide, including Africa. For details of programs, see <http://www.ieha-wehc.org/congresses.html>. A 2013

conference at the International Institute of Social History in Amsterdam included historical presentations on population worldwide. For methods of comparing rates of migration, see also Lucassen and Lucassen (2014).

3. Various estimates are ongoing, aimed at simulating free and slave populations and migrations for nineteenth-century Africa.
4. Meillassoux (1986) is an example of a work that sought to generalize from a single regional experience.
5. Campbell (2005, 114–17) disagrees with the earlier estimates of Maurice Bloch, halving them.
6. Rebecca Shumway, pers. comm., March 7, 2018.
7. Decomposing Eltis's consolidated reporting category of "West Central Africa" for slave exports into subgroups for captives dispatched from north and south of the Congo River shows that, especially in the nineteenth century, Angola was the source of over two-thirds of slave exports from West Central Africa overall. This result reaffirms the likelihood that nineteenth-century population declined in Angola (Eltis, "Slave Voyages"; Manning, Zhang, and Yi 2014–2015, 145).
8. Existing narratives include Lovejoy (2012) and Manning (1990); see also Coquery-Vidrovitch (2018).

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