

# 16

## COUNTING AND CATEGORIZING AFRICAN MIGRANTS, 1980–2020

### Global, Continental, and National Perspectives

*Patrick Manning*

#### 1 Introduction

This chapter addresses recent processes of African migration, at the scales of the continent, its regions, and its nations. To symbolize Africa's place in global demographic dynamics, I rely on the figure of 80 million lives that have been added to the population of the Earth each year from 1980 to 2000, the peak era of global population growth. By 2020, the annual increase in African population had reached almost 40% of the annual global increase. Similarly, Africa's annual level of urbanization reached 20 million per year by 2020. Also in the period 2010–14, an average of roughly 8 million international migrants per year crossed boundaries within their home continent or moved to other continents; the African portion of this total averaged 1.4 million migrants.<sup>1</sup> Other types of displacements, resulting from social conflict or environmental disaster, were of roughly similar magnitude. These African and global migration statistics resulted from advances since 1980 in the analysis by national governments and international organizations: they improved their breadth of coverage, their conceptualization of migration processes, and the precision of their estimates.

At the *continental* level, the chapter begins by comparing African rates of overseas migration from the 19th century to the present. The focus then turns to comparisons of Africa and other continents, 1980–2020. The data show how expanding African population and migration shifted patterns for Africa and the world. The analysis then reviews the changing conceptualization of types of migration. Based on this framework, continental-level migrations are summarized for urbanization, international economic migration (both flows and stocks), refugee flows, and environmental migration.

At the *regional* level, the various types of migration are explored for five standard regions of Africa (as defined by the United Nations (UN)), beginning with a summary of population by region, 1980–2020. The problems and advances in documentation are then explored for each category of migration. Based on these methods, quantitative details on the various types of migration show such results as the rapid rate of urbanization, the predominance of migration within Africa (but also the rise of a global African diaspora), and the regional variations in refugee flows and environmental migration.

The chapter then turns to the *national* level, highlighting the varied experience of six African nations on the issues of international migration, refugee populations, and migrant remittances. Newly available statistics on remittances by migrants to their home country pose important questions on African flows of wealth. Nigeria and South Africa, Africa's national powerhouses, have complex migratory histories. Burkina Faso continues to rely on migration of laborers to nearby countries, while Egypt's numerous migrants go overwhelmingly to the Arabian peninsula. Uganda and the Democratic Republic of Congo (DRC), nations of inherent wealth, have been restricted in growth by recurring refugee movements. In sum, these national studies confirm the growing importance of African migration and African population at a world scale.

## 2 Continental comparisons: populations and migrations

Over the past two centuries, the levels and directions of African migration have fluctuated greatly. From 1750 to 1850, an average of 100,000 African captives per year were delivered overseas (to the north, east, and west) from tropical Africa, which had a population of 100 million in 1800. This translates to a rate of 1.0 migrants per thousand population per year.<sup>2</sup> From 1900 to 1960, African overseas migration fell to near zero (with exceptions in war years, see Killingray, Chapter 14, this volume).<sup>3</sup> After the end of the global slave trade, most African migrants remained within the continent: most numerous were the migrants from Eastern Africa and Western Africa, who remained principally in their home region. With post-war decolonization, a global African diaspora gradually expanded: in the five-year period from 2010 to 2014, African overseas migration reached a new peak of about 700,000 migrants per year. With a continental population of 1.3 billion in 2015, this translates to a rate of 0.5 intercontinental migrants per thousand per year.<sup>4</sup> Thus, overseas outmigration *rates* were considerably higher during the peak of the historical slave trades than they are today. However, today's *total number* of overseas African migrants is much larger, as Africa's continental population has grown ten-fold. Further, since life expectancy in Africa in 1800 was just over 20 years rather than today's 60 years, the effective loss of population through overseas migration was even higher for 19th-century Africa than this comparison suggests (McKeown 2008; Manning 2014a; see also Bales 2004).

From 1980 to 2020, world population increased by 75% (Table 16.1). In that time, the African proportion of world population rose from 11% to 17%. To put this in perspective, African population was less than that of Europe in 1980 but had come close to double the population of Europe by 2020. Phrased differently, Africa's population had grown by 2020 to 30% of the population of Asia. Further, the landmass figures in the final column of Table 16.1 allow calculation of continental population *density* over time, indicating that Africa's population *density* had risen by 2020 to 45% that of Asia.<sup>5</sup>

The annual change in population size is shown by continent in Table 16.2.<sup>6</sup> The *World* category shows that global population has been increasing at just over 80 million persons per year since 1980. This is a valuable measuring rod for comparing the various categories of migration. For instance, between 1980–84 and 2015–19, Africa's share in global population growth rose from 16% to almost 40% of the global total. Further, the numerical growth of African population continues to rise, while absolute growth has been diminishing in other continents.

In addition to growth in total population, three great patterns in migration brought changes to African life after 1980. Rapid urbanization turned the African urban landscape

**TABLE 16.1** Population by continent, 1980–2020, in millions, with continental landmass

	<i>Population</i>					<i>Landmass in million km<sup>2</sup></i>
	<i>1980</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2020</i>	
Africa	480	635	818	1,049	1,353	30
Asia	2,642	3,221	3,730	4,194	4,623	45
Europe	694	722	727	737	743	10
Latin America	364	446	526	598	664	18
Northern America	254	280	313	343	369	24
Oceania	23	27	31	37	42	9
<b>World total</b>	<b>4,458</b>	<b>5,330</b>	<b>6,145</b>	<b>6,958</b>	<b>7,795</b>	<b>150</b>

Source: United Nations (2018); landmass from www.britannica.com.

**TABLE 16.2** World population: average annual change by continent, within five-year periods, in millions of persons

	<i>1980–84</i>	<i>1990–94</i>	<i>2000–04</i>	<i>2010–14</i>	<i>2015–19</i>
Africa	15	18	22	29	32
Asia	55	54	47	45	41
Europe	1	1	0	0	0
Latin America and the Caribbean	8	8	7	7	6
Northern America	2	2	3	3	3
Oceania	0	0	0	0	0
<b>World total</b>	<b>81</b>	<b>84</b>	<b>79</b>	<b>85</b>	<b>83</b>

Source: United Nations (2018); Manning (2021a).

Note: For each five-year period, the average annual population change is the mean population for the period multiplied by the average annual population growth rate for the period (Manning 2021a).

from small capital cities and widely separated port towns into a continental network of massive urban centers linked by moderate- and small-sized cities (also see Meier zu Selhausen, Chapter 13, this volume). Intra-African international migration grew at a pace slower than total African population, while the global African diaspora, though smaller, grew at a faster pace than the total African population.

To express these general statements in specific numbers: Africa's total population rose from 480 million inhabitants in 1980 to 1,350 million in 2020, growing over those 40 years by an average 2.6% per year. Africa's urban population grew, at an average 3.9% per year, from 129 million in 1980 to 588 million in 2020; the continent had become 43% urban by 2020. Intra-African migration led to stocks of migrant population, within Africa, rising from 13 million in 1990 to 21 million in 2020. Overseas stocks of African migrants rose from 7 million in 1980 to 19 million in 2020. More than half of the continent's overseas migrants came from Northern Africa, but the increase took place in other African regions as well. The stocks of African refugee populations rose with fluctuations from 3 million in 1980 to 6 million in 2020. Over a short period of time, the annual flows of environmental migrants more than doubled from 2009 to 2019, from 1.1 to 2.6 million migrants.<sup>7</sup>

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## 2.1 Conceptualizing migration: cross-community migration and its categories

Each of the categories of African migration fits within the common migratory characteristics of the general theory of “cross-community migration.” In each case, individual migrants, especially young adults, move from a home community to another community in which the language and customs are different (Manning 2020, 7–14, 222–9; De Haas and Frankema, Chapter 1, this volume). Migrants in a land of destination, whatever their circumstances, must learn new ways of speaking and acting. They also convey ideas, learn ideas, and create ideas in exchange with those they meet. The migratory passage may be dangerous, relations may vary from cordial to hostile, and migrants may be dominant or subordinate. At the end of the trail, however, these exchanges can contribute substantially to human learning, bringing the essential benefit of cross-community migration in all its varieties.

Africa’s five main varieties of cross-community migration consist of rural-urban migration, international economic migration, migration in response to conflict which occurs across (refugees) as well as within national borders (internally displaced persons, IDPs hereafter), and environmental migration. These forms of migration have been documented by a changing set of international organizations and African national governments. Population censuses were extended within Africa especially by the UN Population Division (founded 1946); the same office took major responsibility for documenting rural-urban migration in Africa. The International Organization for Migration (IOM, founded 1951) focused on international economic migration: it gradually extended its scope to Africa, in cooperation with the World Bank (founded 1944).

## 2.2 Migration to cities

For two centuries, urbanization has been the principal form of migration worldwide. Since 1800, urban populations grew especially in Europe, then in the Americas. By 2020, worldwide urban population was 2.5 times larger than in it had been in 1980 (Table 16.3). African urban populations in the same period had risen by a factor of 4.5, almost twice the global rate of change.<sup>8</sup> As of 2020, European, American, and Oceanic nations remained stable at 75% or 80% urban; Asian and African cities averaged 50% of national population but continued growing. African urban populations exceeded those of Europe and Latin America in 2020; they were nearly double the urban populations of Northern America.

**TABLE 16.3** World urban population in millions, by continent

	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020
Africa	129	200	286	409	588
Asia	717	1,040	1,400	1,877	2,361
Europe	469	505	517	538	557
Latin America and the Caribbean	235	315	397	470	539
Northern America	188	211	247	277	305
Oceania	16	19	21	25	29
<b>World total</b>	<b>1,754</b>	<b>2,290</b>	<b>2,868</b>	<b>3,595</b>	<b>4,379</b>

Source: United Nations (2018).

**TABLE 16.4** World urban population: average annual change by continent, within five-year periods, in millions of persons

	1980–84	1990–94	2000–04	2010–14	2015–19
Africa	7	9	11	17	20
Asia	31	36	47	49	49
Europe	4	2	2	2	2
Latin America and the Caribbean	8	8	7	7	7
Northern America	2	3	3	3	3
Oceania	0	0	0	0	0
<b>World total</b>	<b>52</b>	<b>58</b>	<b>70</b>	<b>78</b>	<b>80</b>

Source: United Nations (2018); Manning (2021b).

Note: For each five-year period, the average annual population change is the mean population for the period multiplied by the average annual population growth rate for the period (Manning 2021b).

Urban population can also be presented in terms of its annual change (Table 16.4). By 2010–14, the world’s annual rise in urban population had reached 78 million – that is, the combination of migrants to cities and births to those already living in cities gave a total (less mortality) that was virtually equal to the annual global population increase (Table 16.2). For Africa, the annual increase in urban population rose from 7 million in 1980–84 to 20 million in 2015–19.<sup>9</sup>

### 2.3 International migration

International migration refers especially to people who cross a national border to seek immediate employment, seek training that will lead to employment, or accompany family members who are workers.<sup>10</sup> The two basic measures of international migration are the *migrant stock* of the foreign-born in each nation at a given moment and the *migrant flow*, the number of international migrants crossing a border within a given time period. When figures on migrant flows are available, they are usually most appropriate for analysis.

A review of international migrant stocks for 2015 reveals four main global patterns in international migration and the place of African migration in those patterns.<sup>11</sup> In 2015 the total stock of persons, worldwide, living outside their homeland was reported as 244 million, or 3.3% of world population (including refugees).<sup>12</sup> The *main* phenomenon in the origin of migrant stocks was migration from one country to another within the same continent. Asia, Europe, Africa, and Latin America, in that order, had large numbers of migrants who stayed on their home continent, totaling a migrant stock of 132 million in 2015 (including 16 million Africans). The *second* phenomenon was south–north migration, from Latin America, Asia, and Africa to Northern America and Europe. These migrants added up to a stock of 73 million in 2015 (including 9 million Africans in Europe and 2 million in Northern America).<sup>13</sup> The *third* phenomenon was migration from Europe to Northern America and Asia, for a total of 14 million migrants in 2015. The *fourth* phenomenon was migration from Africa to Asia: these migrants totaled a stock of 4 million in 2015, mostly from Northern Africa to West Asia.<sup>14</sup>

## 2.4 *Refugees and IDPs*

Post-colonial social conflicts generated large flows of African refugees. The United Nations High Commission for Refugees (UNHCR, founded in 1950, with periodic revisions to its charter) has the responsibility for the care of persons who, in response to social conflict, have crossed national boundaries.<sup>15</sup> Definitions are complex: refugees overlap on one side with international economic migrants (crossing borders) and on the other side with IDPs (displaced by conflict). On the first point, refugees and economic migrants may be accounted separately or together – there are reasons for each approach. On the second point, the distinctions among types of “involuntary migrants” are yet to be fully clarified. IDPs are currently defined as “conflict migrants” within national boundaries, yet they overlap with “disaster migrants” or environmental migrants. The Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC, founded 2008) began to work in parallel with UNHCR and IOM, to focus on IDPs and especially on defining and accounting for environmental migrants.<sup>16</sup> As environmental disaster expands, the need for classifying and documenting it rises, and the problem deepens of combining it with IDPs who are escaping social conflict. Finally, the World Bank has documented remittances to and from African nations in growing detail since 1980. While there remain unresolved debates and uncollected data, these organizations have achieved an impressive advance in the conceptualization and documentation of African migration, as shown in the regional summaries in the remainder of this section.

For African refugees, Frankema’s contribution to this volume (Chapter 15) shows the continental rise in refugees, 1960–95, followed by a decline until roughly 2005 and an increase thereafter. He notes that African refugees, small in number before 1980, ranged between 20% and 40% of the rising global total in the years since 1980. The dramatic increase in reported stocks of refugees reflected both an increase in the number of refugees, as national-level conflicts increased in intensity up to 1995, and an increase in the thoroughness of reporting. On the other hand, the decline in the reported number of refugees to a low point in 2005 indicates that the repatriation of refugees could be successful on a large scale.

Since 1970, Africans have been a large portion of refugee populations worldwide: that is, the largest refugee flows have come from Middle and Northeastern Africa and from the adjoining regions of Southwestern Asia and South Asia. IDPs are observed by the UNHCR but are cared for by national authorities. IDPs are the equivalent of border-crossing refugees who remain in their home country – Sudan Republic has been an example of a country with large numbers of IDPs in addition to the refugees who have fled the country. More commonly, while refugee populations may experience years of difficult exile, many of them are able to achieve resettlement in their home region. Under some circumstances, therefore, refugees might return to their homeland more rapidly than international migrants or might be settled in other countries. For this reason, the totals can be assembled only at an approximate level.

## 2.5 *Environmental migrants*

There is a need for careful assessment for the nature and level of environmental crises in Africa, both in the past and at present.<sup>17</sup> African experiences of severe drought in the middle and late 20th century suggest that the long-term cost of environmental crisis in Africa may have been underestimated.<sup>18</sup> On the one hand, the lack of systematic focus on past

**TABLE 16.5** Estimated conflict and disaster migrants in Africa. Stocks, in thousands

<i>Year</i>	<i>Conflict</i>	<i>Disaster</i>
2009	2,166	1,121
2010	1,225	1,707
2011	2,418	603
2012	2,350	2,047
2013	3,736	1,599
2014	4,864	658
2015	2,415	1,151
2016	2,785	1,078
2017	5,504	2,559
2018	7,531	2,617

*Source:* IDMC, *Annual Report*, 2015–18.

environmental migration means that past experiences of such migration may have been a larger portion of migration overall than has been recognized.

On the other hand, the current acceleration of environmental degradation suggests that, for the future, environmental migration will be the second-largest stream of African migration, after urbanization. Because environmental migrants usually experience a safe evacuation and receive support from neighbors, they are better able to resettle than refugees. Yet the effects of global warming mean that environmental migrants will likely grow in number, and their growing numbers may lead to social conflict. As movements for environmental and climate reform gained strength, the specific needs and the numbers of environmental migrants gained more recognition. For the period 2008–18, the IDMC figures for environmental migrants in Africa average just under 1.5 million migrants per year, fluctuating and growing as shown in Table 16.5. In this view, Africa is unusual in that its high level of conflict displacements has exceeded environmental displacements. As is argued in IDMC reports, environmental displacements are taking place all over the world, rather than being regionally focused as are the social conflicts generating refugees.<sup>19</sup>

### 3 African population and migration, by region

In the period from 1980 to 2020, African populations grew at high rates: 2.1% per year for Northern Africa and Southern Africa and from 2.7% to 3.0% per year in Western, Eastern, and Middle Africa. The results of these high growth rates, compounded, yielded the **growing** decennial regional populations that are shown in Table 16.6. As a result, populations of Western, Eastern, and Middle Africa grew by a factor of 3 from 1980 to 2020, while the populations of Northern and Southern Africa grew by a factor of 2.2. This section explores five categories of migration for these regions: rural-urban migration, international migration within Africa, international migration overseas, refugee movements across national borders, and IDPs including environmental migrants.

When did Africa's rapid population growth begin? Sub-Saharan Africa had a long history of high mortality and slow growth from early modern times into the 20th century. But by

**TABLE 16.6** African total population by region, in millions

<i>Region</i>	<i>1980</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2020</i>
Eastern Africa	148	199	261	347	457
Middle Africa	54	71	96	131	179
Northern Africa	108	141	172	204	246
Southern Africa	30	38	48	56	68
Western Africa	137	181	236	306	403
<b><i>African total</i></b>	<b><i>480</i></b>	<b><i>634</i></b>	<b><i>818</i></b>	<b><i>1,049</i></b>	<b><i>1,352</i></b>

*Source:* United Nations (2018).

1950 Africa had shifted, more rapidly than any other continent, to declining mortality and persistent high growth.<sup>20</sup> Northern African growth exceeded that of sub-Saharan Africa before 1950 but was slower thereafter; the cities of Northern and Southern Africa grew before those of sub-Saharan Africa and continue to benefit from greater public investment (Tabutin and Schoumacher 2005). Under colonial rule, overseas migration from sub-Saharan Africa was almost at a halt.

Migration patterns changed in the era of rapid population growth. Intra-African migration of free persons expanded in the early 20th century, especially in sub-Saharan Africa. The war years brought a great decline in Africa's commercial and industrial activity, though also an expansion in military migration. Intra-African migration recovered from the 1950s, with the main destination shifting from rural to urban (De Haas and Travieso; Meier zu Selhausen, Killingray, Chapters 11, 13, and 14, this volume). Numbers of refugees and IDPs were low throughout Africa before 1950 but grew with decolonization, especially in Middle and Northeastern Africa.

### ***3.1 Problems and advances in documenting migration***

The work of tabulating and estimating African population involves the collection of primary data, analyzing and integrating data to reveal broad patterns, and publication. Over the years, incremental improvements are beginning to add up. Collecting statistics worldwide according to common rubrics has developed only slowly: studies of international migration began with labor migration to wealthy countries, but then expanded. When complete censuses were not available, data were collected by surveys. For these reasons, as well as the intermittent frequency and often poor quality of migration data provided by national statistical offices, international migration is difficult to measure despite its importance.<sup>21</sup>

In a recent and important development, the level of *bilateral* analysis of African migratory has increased. This approach, developed much earlier for some data but only recently applied to African migrants and remittances, systematically traces inflows and outflows of migrants or funds among each pair of nations for each year. It requires that the data be comprehensive and recorded under uniform standards. A major recent application of this method was the 2019 dataset of bilateral stocks of international migration published by the UN Population Division.<sup>22</sup> While previous bilateral stock datasets had been published, this one was at a new level of rigor. One price of this rigor is that it included an effort to be comprehensive by including all refugee stocks in the analysis.<sup>23</sup> In another project of great importance, the team of Guy Abel developed derived estimates of five-year bilateral migrant



flows from migrant stock data.<sup>24</sup> The resulting migrant flows, shown in Table 16.12, may be compared with Tables 16.9 and 16.10, to show how stocks compare to flows of migrants. In a third such advance, the World Bank began collecting worldwide data on national-level remittances, but only succeeded in producing bilateral national remittance estimates beginning 2010.<sup>25</sup> Even these, as is shown in Tables 16.13–16.16, do not yet account for the many types and scales of remittances.

In addition to the search for better data, issues in demographic theory influence the understanding of African migration. For instance, there have been efforts to determine whether rapid African urban growth is to be attributed to high fertility in urban zones or to expanding migration from rural areas (Keyfitz and Philipov 1981; Jedwab, Christiaensen, and Gindelsky 2017; Meier zu Selhausen, Chapter 13, this volume). Recent interpretations have emphasized the primacy of internal urban growth. In my view, global comparisons make clear that the remarkable growth of Asian and especially African cities stems primarily from rural population growth and persistent migration to urban centers. Arguments that urban populations are responsible for all their own growth do recognize that adult migrants to cities originate from rural areas. But by classifying children of recent rural migrants as urban, they understate the role of rural population dynamics in urban and indeed national growth. An appropriate comparison of cities in different world regions would help to clarify this issue.

### 3.2 African urban agglomerations

By 2020, African urban populations – those in centers of over 20,000 persons – reached the point where most areas of the continent had become 50% urban. The exception was Eastern Africa, where urbanization was just reaching 30% in 2020 (Table 16.8). The cities of Northern and Southern Africa, each with substantial urban populations of European ancestry, had relatively high levels of public investment, as in public utilities and paved roads.

Cities of Western, Middle, and Eastern Africa, while they grew at even faster rates, had to rely on small-scale, private investment to build urban facilities. As examples of this regional difference, South Africa's urban rail system began in the 1890s, while Cairo's electric rail system opened in 1987. But Lagos, a city of 15 million, did not open its urban rail system until after 2020, a timing shared by other tropical African cities. Tables 16.7 and 16.8 present data that are consistent with average rates of growth in urban population of 2.7% per year in Northern and Southern Africa, and rates from 4.5% to 4.7% per year in Western, Eastern, and Middle Africa.

**TABLE 16.7** African urban population by region, in millions

<i>Region</i>	<i>1980</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2020</i>
Eastern Africa	21	36	55	85	133
Middle Africa	15	24	38	59	91
Northern Africa	44	65	83	103	129
Southern Africa	15	21	28	35	44
Western Africa	33	54	81	127	192
<b><i>African total</i></b>	<b><i>129</i></b>	<b><i>200</i></b>	<b><i>286</i></b>	<b><i>409</i></b>	<b><i>588</i></b>

*Source:* United Nations (2018).

**TABLE 16.8** Urban population as a percentage of total population, by African region, 1980–2020

Region	1980	1990	2000	2010	2020
Eastern Africa	14	18	21	25	29
Middle Africa	28	34	40	45	51
Northern Africa	41	46	48	51	52
Southern Africa	50	55	58	63	65
Western Africa	24	30	34	42	48
<b>African total</b>	<b>27</b>	<b>32</b>	<b>35</b>	<b>39</b>	<b>44</b>

Source: United Nations (2018).

**TABLE 16.9** International migrant stocks in Africa by region of African origin, in thousands

Region of origin	1990	1995	2000	2005	2010	2015	2019
Eastern Africa	6,723	6,491	4,636	4,290	4,886	6,609	8,532
Middle Africa	1,492	1,361	1,864	1,978	2,177	2,857	3,123
Northern Africa	560	720	790	1,004	857	1,426	1,515
Southern Africa	336	286	306	375	529	715	793
Western Africa	4,318	5,319	5,155	5,677	6,046	6,863	7,245
<b>African total</b>	<b>13,431</b>	<b>14,179</b>	<b>12,753</b>	<b>13,326</b>	<b>14,497</b>	<b>18,471</b>	<b>21,210</b>

Source: United Nations (2019).

### 3.3 Stocks and flows of international migration

Table 16.9 displays the number of foreign-born persons in Africa by the region of their birth. These large stocks of migrants were built up from much smaller flows of migrants each year. Eastern Africa and Western Africa persisted as the source of at least 75% of international migrant stocks within Africa. National-level details confirm that international migrants within Africa remained principally in the region of their birth.<sup>26</sup>

For migrants moving from one part of Africa to another, a total of 21 million migrants were living as “foreign-born” in African countries in 2015. Of that total, 18 million were born in Africa, 1 million were born in Asia, 1 million were born in Europe, and birth-places are not recorded for another 2 million foreign-born persons in African countries. Flahaux and De Haas (2016, 9–11) constructed valuable maps comparing African rates of international outmigration to Africa and to overseas regions, 1960–2000, demonstrating that migrants moved primarily to African destinations. They also added an analysis of “visa restrictiveness,” 1973–2013, showing that African nations overwhelmingly required visas for travel to African nations, though visa restrictions declined somewhat in Western Africa with the formation of Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS) in the 1980s and in South Africa with democracy in the 1990s. Most African nations required visas for migrants from OECD countries, with the exception of Northern African nations and South Africa after 1994 (Flahaux and De Haas 2016, 18–21).

Table 16.10 shows the number of African-born migrants living outside of Africa, identified by their African region of birth. The stock of these overseas migrants rose from 7 million in 1980 to 19 million in 2020. For the year 2015, of the 17 million persons of African birth who lived outside the continent, roughly 9 million lived in Europe, 4 million lived in Asia, 2 million lived in Northern America, and 0.5 million lived in Oceania (mostly Australia).<sup>27</sup>

**TABLE 16.10** International migrant stocks overseas by region of African origin, in thousands

<i>Region of origin</i>	<i>1990</i>	<i>1995</i>	<i>2000</i>	<i>2005</i>	<i>2010</i>	<i>2015</i>	<i>2019</i>
Eastern Africa	1,061	1,243	1,444	1,913	2,555	3,520	4,002
Middle Africa	429	496	574	733	826	958	1,028
Northern Africa	4,726	5,132	5,651	7,001	8,398	9,639	10,342
Southern Africa	448	317	426	529	673	694	763
Western Africa	733	972	1,231	1,705	2,167	2,547	2,857
<b><i>African total</i></b>	<b><i>7,398</i></b>	<b><i>8,162</i></b>	<b><i>9,328</i></b>	<b><i>11,883</i></b>	<b><i>14,621</i></b>	<b><i>17,360</i></b>	<b><i>18,995</i></b>

Source: United Nations (2019).

Of these members of the global African diaspora, a clear majority moved from Northern Africa to work and settle in Europe and West Asia. Northern Africans were 63% of all overseas African migrants in 1990; that figure declined steadily to 54% in 2019.<sup>28</sup> Eastern Africa was the next highest region in overseas migrants, from 15% to 20% of the total. A growing number of Eastern African migrants settled in Asia, though at times these migrants have returned to Eastern Africa in large numbers. For Southern Africa the number of outmigrants has been small, except that relatively large numbers of white South Africans left to settle in Europe and Australia.<sup>29</sup>

Comparison of Tables 16.9 and 16.10 shows that African international migrants settling elsewhere in Africa exceeded the number settling overseas except for Northern Africa, where the overwhelming majority of outmigrants left Africa. In all other cases, overseas outmigration has grown at a higher rate than outmigration to Africa. This pattern of relative growth in overseas outmigration, if continued, will in time lead to overseas migration of Africans exceeding continental migration.

### 3.4 Refugees and IDPs

Unsettled political conditions in Central Africa and especially Northeastern Africa created recurring crowds of refugees after 1960; this portion of Africa is adjacent to Southwest and South Asia, which have similarly experienced large numbers of refugees.<sup>30</sup> The greatest African refugee crisis of the 1990s was the 1994 Rwandan genocide, in which a half million were slaughtered at once, resulting in waves of refugees moving back and forth to Uganda, Tanzania, Burundi, and the DRC for several years. Aftereffects of the Rwandan genocide lasted for at least a decade but, by 2005, refugee populations had declined to a relative low point. Table 16.11 provides the UNHCR summary for that year: it shows echoes of civil wars in the Great Lakes, Ethiopia, Sierra Leone, Liberia, and Angola.

The second great refugee crisis engulfed South Sudan: after its 2011 independence from Sudan Republic, civil war broke out in 2013 and continued until a peace agreement was reached in 2018. The UNHCR reported roughly 2 million refugees in surrounding nations and 2 million more IDPs, who were only slowly repatriated. As of 2018, the African stock of refugees had doubled from 2005, especially because of the crisis in South Sudan and the preceding crises in Darfur and elsewhere within Sudan Republic. Reports were of 1.5 million refugees in Central Africa and the Lakes, 4.3 million in Eastern Africa, 0.2 million in Southern Africa, and 0.3 million in Western Africa.<sup>31</sup>

**TABLE 16.11** Stocks of migrant groups by African region, 2005, in thousands

<i>Region</i>	<i>Refugees</i>	<i>Returned refugees</i>	<i>Asylum-seekers</i>	<i>Internally displaced</i>
Central Africa – Great Lakes	1,087	119	99	12
East Africa and Horn	1,336	31	90	1,242
North Africa	101	13		
South Central Africa	228	54	31	
Southern Africa	1			
West Africa	409	78	55	279
<b><i>African total</i></b>	<b><i>3,162</i></b>	<b><i>295</i></b>	<b><i>265</i></b>	<b><i>1,533</i></b>

Source: UNHCR (2005, Table 2).

### 3.5 Environmental migrants

As noted earlier, the term “environmental migrants” is now used widely, replacing a term that treated these displaced persons as refugees. While the UN and national governments attempted to provide relief to the victims of earthquakes, floods, fires, tsunamis, and droughts, such assistance was ad hoc, so that neither administration nor record-keeping was formalized. In the 1990s, the UNHCR gave increasing attention to those displaced by various types of natural disaster. Migrants fleeing natural disaster were initially placed in the category of IDPs, since they remained mostly within national borders. They were later placed in the separate category now known as “environmental migrants.”

Reports of the IDMC, 2008–18, identified over 500 African cases of environment displacement by nation, year, and number of persons affected, though without further details. Of the 30 cases that asserted displacement of over 100,000 persons, 11 were in Northeastern Africa (in Sudan, South Sudan, Ethiopia, Somalia, and Kenya); 6 were in Southeast Africa (in Mozambique, Madagascar, and Malawi); 8 were in the Lake Chad basin (Nigeria, Niger, and Chad); and 3 were in Middle Africa (Angola and the DRC).<sup>32</sup> Sadly, it appears that the African regions undergoing the most serious environmental crisis are closely related to the regions where refugees have also been most numerous. It seems clear that environmental migration, now understood to have characteristics that make it distinct from other types of migration, needs to be accounted for more systematically in the documentation of African migration.

## 4 National-level examples of international migration and remittances

Africa’s more than 50 nations, cataloged by the UN into five regions, resist easy summary. However, since the contemporary world is organized into nations, this overview of recent African migration must address aspects of the national experience. I have chosen to focus on the connections among African nations, as seen through the levels of international migration, international remittances, and per-capita remittances. I have chosen one nation from each of the continent’s five regions plus a second for the most populous region, Western Africa. The selected nations are Burkina Faso, Nigeria, the DRC, South Africa, Uganda, and Egypt.<sup>33</sup> In addition to their regional distribution, these nations reveal different patterns of interconnection.

#### 4.1 International migration

The bilateral international flows of migrants for these nations, 1980–2014, are shown in Table 16.12 (Abel 2018). These migrant-flow data represent a major advance in the quality of estimates of international migration for these nations. For the whole period from 1980 to 2019, Table 16.12 makes clear the variance in migratory patterns: migration within Africa exceeded overseas migration for Burkina Faso, the DRC, and Uganda, while Egypt's overseas migration greatly exceeded its African migration. For Nigeria and South Africa, African and overseas migration were roughly equal, though with fluctuations for each country. Immigration to Africa from overseas was tiny in almost every case – the exception was South Africa, with remarkably large numbers of overseas immigration, especially 2005–09. Nevertheless, it is likely that future estimates of bilateral flows will replace those in Table 16.12. For instance, while the underlying data on migrant stocks reported by Egypt and South Africa are the most complete and detailed of the six nations, those of other nations, especially the DRC, had gaps and inconsistencies. Updating of such datasets is a common practice.

The levels of African continental and overseas migration, while growing along with African population, are still relatively small on a global scale. For these six nations, the highest level of migration to Africa was an average of 2 per thousand (2 ‰) of national population each year for Burkina Faso; the highest level of overseas migration was an average 1 ‰ per year for Egypt. For the six nations as a group, these ratios were 0.2 ‰ for intra-African migration (below the rate of 0.5 ‰ for the continent as a whole) and 0.5 ‰ for overseas (same as the continental rate), respectively.

**TABLE 16.12** Average annual flow of migrants, in thousands, by nation

	<i>Burkina Faso</i>				<i>Nigeria</i>				<i>DRC</i>			
	<i>To Africa</i>	<i>From Africa</i>	<i>To overseas</i>	<i>From overseas</i>	<i>To Africa</i>	<i>From Africa</i>	<i>To overseas</i>	<i>From overseas</i>	<i>To Africa</i>	<i>From Africa</i>	<i>To overseas</i>	<i>From overseas</i>
1990–94	53.0	21.6	0.4	1.7	19.5	7.9	8.8	0.3	13.5	248.4	0.0	5.1
1995–99	43.8	17.5	1.3	0.0	6.9	20.1	33.5	0.0	190.7	2.8	13.9	0.0
2000–04	44.7	24.1	4.4	–	16.1	17.4	34.5	0.0	51.3	11.8	8.5	0.0
2005–09	43.6	21.2	2.5	0.0	27.8	21.7	53.5	0.1	21.4	17.1	4.5	0.2
2010–14	34.5	12.1	2.6	–	22.4	31.3	69.1	0.0	31.7	17.3	6.4	1.6
	<i>South Africa</i>				<i>Uganda</i>				<i>Egypt</i>			
	<i>To Africa</i>	<i>From Africa</i>	<i>To overseas</i>	<i>From overseas</i>	<i>To Africa</i>	<i>From Africa</i>	<i>To overseas</i>	<i>From overseas</i>	<i>To Africa</i>	<i>From Africa</i>	<i>To overseas</i>	<i>From overseas</i>
1990–94	2.0	102.3	0.0	60.4	17.2	13.7	0.0	27.2	12.4	0.4	80.7	1.8
1995–99	1.9	55.7	26.1	3.8	19.1	17.7	9.0	0.9	1.7	1.6	42.9	1.8
2000–04	1.3	117.3	16.0	97.3	12.6	13.5	2.1	0.4	1.7	2.1	32.0	18.4
2005–09	1.8	137.3	25.8	143.3	36.9	17.4	8.1	0.7	0.8	1.3	59.8	3.6
2010–14	5.3	112.8	26.8	39.3	40.8	24.2	13.5	0.0	1.0	6.7	78.8	29.8

Source: Abel (2018).

Notes: Total flows of men and women, based on demographic and migrant stock data published by the UN in 2015, except for South Africa 2000–09, which is based on migration data from 2010 and demographic data from 2013. For further information and data caveats, see discussion in Abel (2018).

Inmigration from Africa was largest for South Africa, a pattern that clearly reflects the transition from apartheid to a democratic regime. After 2000 and especially after 2010, new economic opportunities in South Africa brought increasing inmigration, especially from neighboring nations. As shown in Table 16.12, South African inmigration was well over 100,000 per year after 2000. For Burkina Faso and Nigeria, inmigration averaged roughly 20,000 per year, while inmigration averaged closer to 15,000 per year for the DRC and Uganda. Refugee flows are clearly visible in the statistics. Annual flows of 248,000 migrants migrated to the DRC in 1990–94 (the era of the Rwandan genocide), followed by annual flows of 190,000 migrants leaving the DRC in 1995–99.

The case of Egypt reveals the general disconnection of Northern African nations from migratory interaction with other African nations – even with each other. The large numbers of Egyptian overseas emigrants – nearly 80,000 per year in 2010–14 – went dominantly to West Asia, especially to Saudi Arabia, though significant numbers also went to European and Northern American destinations. (From Algeria and Morocco, the largest numbers of emigrants went to France and elsewhere in Europe.) Other nations of large-scale overseas migration were Nigeria and South Africa. Nigeria’s overseas emigration rose from 9,000 per year in 1990–94 to 69,000 per year in 2010–14, with most going to Europe and then to Northern America; these doubtless included many professionals. Table 16.12 shows that outmigration from South Africa averaged 24,000 per year, 1995–2014. The study of Cronjé (2006) indicates that this was principally the departure of white South Africans, who moved to Europe in numbers of 9,000 to 15,000 a year, to Australia in numbers from 2,000 to 10,000 per year, and in smaller numbers to Northern America. At a smaller but nonetheless significant scale, overseas emigration from both the DRC and Uganda fluctuated from 2,000 to 14,000 in each of the years from 1995 to 2014.

#### 4.2 *Remittance flows*

For the same six countries, I turn now to the issue of remittances – incoming and outgoing, to Africa and overseas.<sup>34</sup> Since 1980, the levels of African remittance flows in all directions have increased; further, the thoroughness of recording remittances has also increased. Only within the past decade have the recorded levels of remittance flow become dependable for most countries. Table 16.13 combines two types of data to give a composite picture of the expansion of remittance flows for these six nations since 1980. It shows decennial estimates from 1980 to 2009 followed by three annual estimates since 2010. The main message of Table 16.13 is that international flow of remittances has expanded substantially in all African countries, though with sharply different national patterns. In almost every case, incoming remittances exceeded outgoing flows; only for South Africa were the two flows roughly balanced. Nigeria had the largest inflows, followed closely by Egypt and South Africa, while other nations were far behind.

Table 16.14 shows more complete annual levels of incoming and outgoing remittances for 2010, 2014, and 2018, distinguishing flows within Africa from those to and from overseas regions.<sup>35</sup> As the table confirms, flows of remittances for Burkina Faso and the DRC were limited almost entirely to Africa; Uganda’s overseas remittances were near to its African remittances; and Egypt remains focused on earning overseas remittances. Egypt and Nigeria have received the largest remittances in Africa, but Burkina Faso, with its modest population, receives remittances that are almost as large on a per-capita basis.

**TABLE 16.13** Annual remittances in millions of US dollars by nation, 1980–2018.

Years	Burkina Faso		Nigeria		DRC	
	To	From	To	From	To	From
(average)						
1980–89	145	47	11	271		
1990–99	58	33	802	13		
2000–09	68	76	9,426	36	10	21
2010	139	279	39,815	310		
2014	120	293	20,872	521	23	62
2018	43	383	24,356	1,411	1,821	126

  

Years	South Africa		Uganda		Egypt	
	To	From	To	From	To	From
(average)						
1980–89	63	983			3,133	3
1990–99	161	755	23	23	4,041	154
2000–09	563	897	433	294	4,880	104
2010	1,120	676	769	234	12,453	194
2014	914	2,244	1,029	150	19,571	372
2018	928	413	1,231	573	25,516	464

Source: World Bank (2016) [1980 – 2009]; Table 16. 14 [2010 – 2018]

Note: Empty cells indicate that no data are available.

**TABLE 16.14** Annual remittances in millions of US dollars by nation, 2010–2018.

	Burkina Faso				Nigeria				DRC			
	From		To		From		To		From		To	
	Africa	Overseas	Africa	Overseas	Africa	Overseas	Africa	Overseas	Africa	Overseas	Africa	Overseas
2010	115	24	277	2	4,609	15,208	230	80				
2014	116	4	293		6,423	14,449	511	10	13	10	62	
2018	418	18	383		7,349	17,007	1,404	7	1,145	678	126	

  

	South Africa				Uganda				Egypt			
	Inward		Outward		Inward, from		Outward, to		Inward, from		Outward, to	
	Africa	Overseas	Africa	Overseas	Africa	Overseas	Africa	Overseas	Africa	Overseas	Africa	Overseas
2010	263	857	666	10	454	314	234		1,160	11,293	25	169
2014	98	815	975	1,269	512	517	119	31	300	19,271	36	336
2018	136	792	2,365	2,105	769	462	526	47	453	25,063	41	423

Source: World Bank, “Bilateral Remittance Matrix,” reports for 2010–18.

### 4.3 *Remittances per migrant*

Tables 16.15 and 16.16 provide initial estimates of remittances per migrant for each of the six nations during the decade of the 2010s. Remittances per migrant, shown in columns 2 and 4, are calculated as average remittances, 2010–18 (from Table 16.14), divided by the stock of migrant remitters (from columns 1 and 3). (As a reminder: remittances move in a direction opposite to the migrants sending the funds.) Migrant stock – the number of persons in any nation from each other nation at a given moment – is taken as the best available estimate of migrants sending remittances home. This figure, however, yields a high estimate of the number of migrant workers able to send remittances, because it includes non-working children and retirees. (The chief alternative figure, the flow of migrants in any single year, will give far too low an estimate, since migrants are away for indeterminate times, commonly spending several years away at work before returning home.) Two further factors complicate the effort to calculate a ratio of remittances per migrant. First, there are cases where high estimates of remittance per migrant clearly reflected financial transactions, unrelated to wage work by migrant laborers. At the other extreme, for refugees counted among migrants, their remittances were tiny at best, as they were rarely able to get regular employment. Tables 16.15 and 16.16 thus reflect preliminary but instructive estimates of remittances per African migrant.

In Table 16.15, for migrants and their remittances within Africa, the estimated annual remittance of \$146 for 1.5 million migrants, sent home to Burkina Faso, seems surprisingly low. At the opposite extreme, the per-migrant remittances to Egypt, Nigeria, and Uganda (column 2) are surprisingly high. Meanwhile, the figures in column 4 give relatively consistent indications of out-remittances from all six nations (though, as noted, these are low estimates).

Table 16.16 shows overseas remittances, with most payments incoming to Africa (column 2) but some funds leaving Africa (column 4). Comparison of column 2 in Tables 16.15 and 16.16 – the incoming per-migrant remittances to the six nations from Africa and overseas – yields both expected and unexpected results. For Burkina Faso, the DRC, and Nigeria, the per-migrant remittances received from overseas were two or three times higher than remittances from Africa. This may be called an expected result in that wage levels are generally lower for Africa than for overseas. But for the other three countries – Egypt, South Africa, and Uganda – the per-migrant remittances received from overseas were smaller than remittances from Africa.

### 4.4 *The range of national-level migration patterns*

The six nations discussed in this section were chosen more for the differences among them than for their similarities. They provide examples of variance within Africa but do not provide a representative set of cases. Further, the discussion has focused primarily on international migration and on remittances from Africa and overseas, rather than on other aspects of migration. We do gain a sense of typical levels of the annual flow of international migration among African countries. Thus, it appears that nations sending large numbers of international migrants to Africa were led by Burkina Faso, followed by Uganda, the DRC, and Nigeria. Nations receiving substantial flows of entering international migrants from Africa were led by South Africa, with Nigeria, Burkina Faso, and others far behind. Only



**TABLE 16.15** African migration stocks and average remittances, 2010–18

<i>Nation</i>	<i>Outmigration to Africa</i>		<i>Immigration from Africa</i>	
	(1) <i>Stock of outmigrants, in thousands</i>	(2) <i>Annual flow of in-remittances per African outmigrant, USD</i>	(3) <i>Stock of in-migrants, in thousands</i>	(4) <i>Annual flow of out-remittances per overseas in-migrant, USD</i>
Burkina Faso	1,482	\$146	653	\$487
DRC	1,225	\$473	716	\$131
Egypt	51	\$12,415	91	\$375
Nigeria	521	\$11,764	1,031	\$694
South Africa	89	\$1,865	1,969	\$347
Uganda	586	\$12,415	1,014	\$296

Source: Migrant stocks from international migration reports; remittances from Table 14.

**TABLE 16.16** Overseas migration stocks and average remittances, 2010–18

<i>Nation</i>	<i>Outmigration to overseas</i>		<i>Immigration from overseas</i>	
	(1) <i>Stock of outmigrants, in thousands</i>	(2) <i>Annual flow of in-remittances per African outmigrant, USD</i>	(3) <i>Stock of in-migrants, in thousands</i>	(4) <i>Annual flow of out-remittances per overseas in-migrant, USD</i>
Burkina Faso	29	535		
DRC	271	1,266	282	1,096
Egypt	3,064	6,051		
Nigeria	706	22,018	600	12
South Africa	686	1,197	9	3,578
Uganda	137	3,142		

Source: Migrant stocks from International migration reports; remittances from Table 16.14.

South Africa had more in-migrants than outmigrants; for the other five nations studied, outmigrants were the largest proportion, especially for Egypt.

Data on remittances, despite their limitations, reveal some clear patterns. For all six countries, incoming and outgoing remittances rose steadily from 1980 to 2020. For overseas flows, in-remittances to Africa were always higher than out-remittances from Africa, except for South Africa. For Burkina Faso, the DRC, and Uganda after 2010, in-remittances from African countries were greater than from overseas. In contrast, for Nigeria, South Africa, and Egypt, overseas in-remittances were larger than those from Africa. While these national-level conclusions are still preliminary, they show that statistical comparison of African nations can now go beyond population totals and foreign trade to give details on international migration and remittances.

## 5 Conclusion

The purpose of this chapter has been to set African migration comprehensively in global, African regional, and comparative national contexts. The recurring figure of 80 million more humans each year provides a standard for describing Africa's growing prominence in the world population. For instance, the African portion of that total growth rose from 15 million per year in 1980 to 32 million per year in 2020. African urban population growth worldwide reached 20 million per year by 2020. In international migration, annual global international migration was at a flow of 8 million migrants in 2010–14.<sup>36</sup> The African portion of this figure, including both African and overseas migration, was roughly 1.4 million; the overseas portion of African migration flows has caught up with and seems poised to exceed continental migration in the coming decade. Numbers for involuntary migration worldwide, while not yet precise, equal or exceed international migration. In Middle and Eastern Africa, refugees outnumber environmental migrants; in most of the rest of the world, environmental migrants are more numerous. For each dimension of migration, the African experience must now be seen as significant at a global level.

The two outstanding factors in Africa's population and migration since 1980 are the growth in national populations at rates well over 2% per year and the urban growth at nearly 4% per year. Africa already has some 50 cities with over 1 million in population – more than for Europe, Latin America, or Northern America. The third key factor is the great variation in African national migration patterns – in international migration, for various categories of refugees, and environmental migrants. Nor can the continent be summarized through one or two iconic cases: Nigeria and South Africa are the great powers of Africa, yet between them they hold only 20% of the continent's population and just over 30% of its GDP. African migratory analysis, nation by nation, will remain an essential element of the continent's social statistics. As research continues, one may hope for national-level statistics that provide a comprehensive picture of African migratory change at the national level.

Regional patterns are already emerging. Migration data give the impression that ECOWAS, the West African economic union, has made progress in integrating the national economies of Western Africa through migratory exchange. South Africa, historically strong as a regional economy, yet with a long and difficult apartheid era, appears to be making a transition into somewhat more open relations with nations throughout the continent. Eastern, Northern, and Middle Africa each appear to have faced substantial weaknesses as seen through migration patterns. The nations of Eastern Africa might be expected to be developing economic, cultural, and migratory ties within the region, but in these data only the migratory flows are evident. In Northern Africa, with its relatively high levels of health and income, reliance on overseas migration and remittances is at a high level. In sum, all three of Africa's key demographic factors – population growth, urbanization, and the complexity of migration – make Africa different from the rest of the world in population and migration. Yet precisely because African nations are becoming so populous, the varying national experiences must be followed closely.

## Acknowledgment

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## Notes

- 1 Flow data from Abel (2018), based on UN migrant stocks data.
- 2 Manning (2014a). For an archival collection on African population, overseas and continental enslavement, 1650–1950, see Patrick Manning, compiler. *African Population and Migration Dataverse*, [https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/WH\\_AfricanPopMigration](https://dataverse.harvard.edu/dataverse/WH_AfricanPopMigration).
- 3 During the “age of mass migration” (1840 to 1940) European outmigration averaged 500,000 emigrants per year. With a population of 400 million (including Russia), this implies a rate of 0.8 migrants per 1,000 population per year (McKeown 2008, 55–6).
- 4 Flow data from Abel (2018), based on UN migrant stocks data.
- 5 For further details on regional population density in Africa, see Manning (2014b, 67–73).
- 6 For each five-year period, the average annual population change is the mean population for the period multiplied by the average annual population growth rate for the period.
- 7 International Displacement Monitoring Centre (IDMC), *Global Report on International Displacement, 2020*, 16.
- 8 Compare Table 16.3 to Table 16.1 to find the levels of urbanization by continent.
- 9 For discussion of African urbanization since 1950, see Meier zu Selhausen (Chapter 13, this volume).
- 10 This category is diverse in that it involves those seeking work at the level of basic skills (perhaps for temporary or seasonal work) but also for long-term settlement; the same category includes long-term settlement by skilled professionals and short-term visits by consultants.
- 11 These results come from tracing migrant stocks from continent to continent (as cited in IOM reports) and ranking them from the largest to the smallest.
- 12 This proportion is roughly double that of the earlier peak of international migration in the era from 1910 to 1930, as reported in McKeown (2008, 55–6). For the DEMIG databases, which have launched comparisons on international migration flows to the 19th century, see Vezzoli, Villares-Varela, and de Haas (2014).
- 13 This continental overview of international migration reinforces the conclusions of Flahaux and De Haas (2016, 2), who contradicted widespread but undocumented notions that African migration was a “South–north ‘exodus’ driven by poverty and income gaps,” through their demonstration that migration to African nations exceeded overseas migration. See also Abel and Sander (2014).
- 14 Beyond these four main migratory phenomena were numerous other groups of foreign-born with less than 3 million in each continental pairing: to Oceania and from Oceania; from Northern America; and to Africa.
- 15 Compare, for instance, the categories of migration reported in the UNHCR *Global Trends* reports for 1990 and 2010; also see Frankema (Chapter 15, this volume). An administratively separate category of refugees is that of the Palestinian refugees ejected from their homes as Israel formed in 1948, who receive care from a separate UN organization, the United Nations Relief and Works Agency (UNRWA). In this and some other cases, refugee status has lasted even for generations.
- 16 Internal Displacement Monitoring Centre, *Annual Report, 2008*, 7. The IDMC has offices in Geneva but is supported especially by Norwegian funding. See Brown (2008); IOM (2016); Borderon et al. (2019).
- 17 De Haas and Frankema classify environmental crises as an episodic, proximate driver rather than a macro-historical driver of migration (De Haas and Frankema, Chapter 1, this volume). In contrast to the fluctuations of the past, however, there is substantial evidence that the world is now undergoing a historic expansion in environmental crises.
- 18 On the West African drought of the 1960s and its antecedents, see Lovejoy and Baier (1975). On more recent patterns, see Bassett and Turner (2007).
- 19 Combining reports of the IDMC, UNHCR, and IOM for 2015, the worldwide flows of economic migrants, international conflict refugees, and domestic conflict refugees were roughly equal – about 8 million migrants per year in each category. For 2016–18, the IDMC has estimated global domestic conflict refugees at roughly 10 million per year and domestic migrants from disasters (environmental) at roughly 20 million per year. IDMC, *Annual Report, 2015–18*; UNHCR, *Global Trends, 2015*; IOM, *Migration Portal Data, 2015*.
- 20 The exact pace of this transformation has yet to be established empirically. For contrasting views on the rapidity of the change in mortality and net population growth in Africa, especially 1900–50, see Manning (2010); Frankema and Jerven (2014).

- 21 African governments contributed to this documentation, although it was difficult to expand their professional staff under the World Bank-imposed structural adjustment programs, especially 1980–2000.
- 22 United Nations, Population Division. *International Migrant Stock Documentation*. 2019.
- 23 This version may be followed by later versions in which economic migrants and refugees are distinguished systematically within the overall dataset.
- 24 The program uses log-linear analysis to estimate “the minimum number of migrant transitions required to match the changes in stock data, controlling for births and deaths in each country over the period” (Abel 2018, 825).
- 25 World Bank, “Bilateral Remittance Matrix,” 2010–17.
- 26 For newly available data on migrant flows for six African nations over the same years, see Table 16.12. They are calculated based on the bilateral method of Abel (2018).
- 27 IOM, World Migration Report, 2015.
- 28 On 1990–2005 migration from the Maghreb to Europe and from Egypt to Saudi Arabia, the Gulf states, and Europe, see Tabutin and Schoumacher (2005, 574–83).
- 29 On post-1994 migration of South African whites to the UK and especially Australia, see Cronjé (2006).
- 30 For maps showing that the incidence of refugee departure and IDPs has been centered in Central and Northeastern Africa and in West Asia, with illustrations from 2006 and 2018, see UNHCR, *Global Trends* (2006), 7, 12; and UNHCR, *Global Trends* (2018), 10.
- 31 UNHCR, *Global Trends*, 2018.
- 32 IDMC, Annual Reports, 2015–18.
- 33 For reference, their 2020 populations in millions were Burkina Faso (18), Nigeria (206), the DRC (103), South Africa (60), Uganda (46), and Egypt (101).
- 34 For an overview of African remittances that accompanied the expansion of World Bank analysis of this topic, see Mohapatra and Ratha (2011).
- 35 The reports of the World Bank’s “Bilateral Remittance Matrix,” from which these data are taken, provide matrices without detailed comments on fluctuations in the size of annual figures. Questions about fluctuations in reported levels of remittances must be addressed in separate research.
- 36 Including refugees. Abel (2014, 2018).

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